






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AUTHENTIC
MEMOIRS
OF
TIPPOO SULTAUN,
INCLUDING
HIS CRUEL TREATMENT OF
ENGLISH PRISONERS;
ACCOUNT OF HIS CAMPAIGNS WITH
THE MAHRATTAS, RAJAHS, WARREN HASTINGS, ESQ.
LORD CORNWALLIS, AND LORD MORNINGTON;
PLUNDERS, CAPTURES, INTRIGUES,
AND
SECRET CORRESPONDENCE WITH FRANCE, AS LAID
BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.
ALSO,
DESCRIPTIONS OF EASTERN COUNTRIES
HITHERTO UNKNOWN,
PALACES, GARDENS, ZENANNA, &c. &c.
WITH
A PRELIMINARY SKETCH
OF
THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF
HYDER ALLY CAWN.

By an OFFICER in the EAST INDIA SERVICE.

CALCUTTA:

RE-PRINTED AT THE MIRROR PRESS,
BY P. CRICHTON.

1819.

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PREFACE.

THE considerable advantages arising from the East India Establishment, and the vast acquisitions derived from our conquest of the Mysore Country, must render the MEMOIRS OF TIPPoo SULTAUN an interesting Narrative---a lesson too, worthy the contemplation of every person; as it sets forth, in lively colours, the fall of Ambition and the just reward of Pride. This History, though concise, contains many curious entertaining Anecdotes, and faithful description of the several remarkable countries of Mysore, hitherto unnoticed by other Writers.

No Account of this Extraordinary Character having been offered to the Public, except a volu-

minous History of the War in 1792, it is presumed that this Volume, uniting all the chief Occurrences of his Life, must be highly acceptable to the Lovers of Biography. The Work, we trust, bears sufficient testimony of its own authenticity; but, as a fuller assurance, the reader is respectfully informed, that it comes from the Pen, which was the first to announce to Great Britain our glorious Victory at Seringapatam.

MEMOIRS
OF
TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAP. I.

Education of Tippoo—His respect for learned men—Admired by the women—Review of the Mahometan power in Mysore, and the English establishment at Bengal—Enmity between Hyder and the Mahrattas—Views of the Bengal Directors—Heroism of Tippoo when eighteen years of Age—Mahrattas at war with the English and Hyder Ally—Governor Hastings's political measures.

ACCORDING to the manners of the East, the great and despotic usurper Hyder Ally Cawn made it his first care to engrave on the mind of his son Tippoo Saib, the general qualifications of Indian

Chiefs---ambition and ferocity. The use of warlike instruments is there esteemed the first part of education; cruelty too often mistaken for heroism, and impetuosity for magnanimity. Tippoo gave early proofs of all these Indian *virtues*, and was always admitted into his father's councils. He was still partial to the company of learned men, and had among his privy counsellors a Bramin of considerable genius, whose productions were hoarded up in the royal archives.

He was also as much attached to women as his father, for every leisure hour was spent with a mistress; and at these intervals Tippoo discovered much gaiety and gallantry, which are there esteemed sure indications of future greatness---the character of an amorist being supposed to approach that of the hero, as it is always believed that love and valour are united. The bravest hero, as he is there called, but what we should term the greatest despot, is always the most beloved among the ladies, and as Tippoo had some favourites among the women, those *partial* embraces created much envy and jealousy. He had several illegitimate children. He was ever careful that punishment should be duly exercised, which indeed was absolutely necessary to preserve regularity; though it has been asserted by some historians, that the inhabitants of Mysore are a quiet, harmless race, but I have witnessed the contrary. I have found them in general ambi-

ous, dishonest and cruel, some few excepted, whose sympathetic hearts seemed to revolt at the cruel and vindictive measures of their chiefs.

The Mahometan power in Mysore was wholly founded by Hyder. The events which led to his establishment as an independent potentate were nearly coeval with the revolutions in Bengal, which ended in the acquisition of the Dewannies by the company, and in effect gave us the dominion of a rich, fertile, and populous territory. Our aggrandizement sprung out of the weakness of the Mogul Empire, which in consequence of successive invasions from the side of Persia, had been broken in pieces, all the viceroys and governors assuming independence in their several provinces and districts, and exhausting their strength in mutual contentions. But the same circumstances which now invaded us had long before assisted the great Hindoo power, the confederacy of the Mahrattas, to extend their conquests internally from the Northern Circars of the Nizam, on the coast of Coromandel, to the confines of Agra and Delhi, and across from sea to sea from the gulphs of Cambay to the bay of Bengal. From their geographical situation, in the centre of the peninsula, they pressed with a compact and consolidated force against the divided relics of the Mahometan Empire, with which they were surrounded. To the government of Bengal they were peculiarly an object of jealousy.

sy and alarm: since, under an old grant from the Court of Delhi, they asserted a claim to the receipt of chout, or a tribute of one fourth part from the revenues of that province. This had been enforced by them with an immense army of cavalry, that pillaged all the frontier districts of Bengal for ten successive years, in the time of Aliverdy Khan. The internal embarrassments of their own government at length obliged them to desist, but the ground of their demand they had never abandoned.

These circumstances seemed to point out an obvious policy. It was our interest to preserve all the conterminous soubahdars and nabobs in such a state as to form a barrier against the common enemy, the Mahrattas. To have obtained that security for the peace of our own possessions, we should have employed all our good offices. Hyder Ally, more especially, was qualified to have been at the head of such a system. He had raised himself on the ruin of an ancient dynasty of Hindoo kings. While he possessed but a small part of Mysore, in the character of *Regent*, the progress of his fortunes was opposed by the Mahrattas. They besieged him in the fortress of Bangalore, but he repulsed them, and after he became master of the whole kingdom, retaliated upon them the injuries which they had done him. He was daily enlarging his bounds at their expence,

The Court of Directors clearly saw, and in their dispatches marked out the track which their servants should adhere to, as appears from the following extract, the policy of which Lord Cornwallis so faithfully pursued.

General Letter to Bengal, June 30, 1769.

Par. 3. " In several of our letters since we have been engaged as principals in the politics of India, and particularly during the last two or three years, we have given our opinion that the most prudent system we could pursue, and the most likely to be attended with a permanent security to our possessions, would be to incline to those few chiefs of Hindostan who yet preserve an independence of the Mahratta power, and are in a condition to struggle with them; for, so long as they are able to keep up that struggle, the acquisitions of the Company will run no risk of disturbances."

Par. 4. " The Rohillas, the Gauts, the Nabob of the Decan, and the *Mysore Chief*, have each in their turn kept the Mahrattas in action, and we wish them still to do it; it is therefore *with great concern* we see the war continuing with *Hyder*, and a probability of a rupture with Sujah Dowla and Nizam Ally. In such wars we have every thing to lose and nothing to gain, for supposing our operations to be attended with the utmost success, and our enemies reduced to our mercy, we can only wish to see them restored

to the condition from which they set out, that is to such a degree of force and independence as may enable them still to keep up the contest with the Mahrattas and with each other.”

However, the influence of the Nabob of Arcot over the presidency of Madras was well known, and he was the inveterate enemy of Hyder Ally. At once to gratify his ambition and emulate the late splendid acquisitions on the Banks of the Ganges, the President and Council, about the year 1767, entered on a plan of obtaining the Soubahdary of the Decan for the Nabob of Arcot, and of reinstating the royal family of Mysore under the protection of the same Nabob and the English. This was met by a counter treaty of partition between Hyder and the Nizam. A war ensued. Beaten on the field, Hyder still had the address to baffle all our operations, by avoiding a general engagement, and intercepting our convoys, while his son Tippoo, then a youth of *eighteen*, at the head of a considerable detachment of horse, surprised the town, and almost carried the fort of Madras. After one campaign a treaty was concluded with the Nizam; and it was made an express stipulation that he should join in punishing his late ally as a rebel and usurper; while, for a district formerly wrested by Hyder from the Nizam, and now ceded to the English by the latter, the English agreed to pay chout to the Mahrattas. But we were sav-

ed the payment of this chout, for we never were able to get possession of the lands, and the next year the *rebel and usurper* dictated a peace to the English at the gates of Madras.

The disgrace which we had thus suffered, seems to have made a deeper impression on our minds than the moderation with which Hyder used his advantage. Nor did the Nabob of Arcot cease to employ all his influence to inflame our animosity. The treaty fixed the rate at which assistance was to be mutually afforded : Hyder often-applied, when he was attacked by the Mahrattas, but the Company not being positively bound by the letter of treaty, no aid was ever given. During ten years of peace he was more and more alienated from the English.

In the year 1779 an extraordinary scene commenced. The Mahrattas were at war both with the English and the Chief of Mysore. They were inclined to an accommodation with the former, in hopes of gaining their assistance for the ruin of Hyder Ally. On his part he proposed a treaty of closer amity with the English. We declined both, and such was the infatuated conduct of the Presidency of Madras, though disapproved by the supreme government of Bengal, that the Nizam at the same time was so exasperated by them, as to project and form the great league between three powers the most rootedly hostile, himself, Hyder Ally, and the different

members of the Mahratta confederacy ; among whom may be reckoned on this occasion, the Rajah of Bezar. We now once more smarted under the vengeance of Hyder. He again invaded the Carnatic, desolating the country before him, and carrying fire, sword, and famine to the gates of Madras. Upon him therefore as our most formidable antagonist, all our indignation was turned ; and pressed as Mr. Hastings was in 1780, by the complicated difficulties of the war (so pressed, as to purchase the neutrality of Bezar with a large sum of money, which, on whatever pretence it may have been paid, was received under the name of chout from Bengal) he yet urged it as a necessary condition of peace with the Mahrattas, that they should join their troops with ours, for the extirpation of their confederate and partner of the war. But they rejected the proposition with strong language of disdain : “ Would not this (they said) fix the stamp of infamy upon us for ever ? would any price, for generations to come, ever after assist or unite with the Peshwah ? ” At the same time they regretted the loss of the former opportunity, “ which would not have left a trace of Hyder ; ” and they hinted further, “ that as for the sake of appearances a pretence was necessary, they would consult and find out some accusation against him the first opportunity.” And subject to this mental reservation, this secret understand-

ing inimical to Hyder, was the treaty with the Mahrattas ultimately concluded. The Governor General, in a short set of instructions to Mr. Anderson, one of his negociators, recurred no less than three times on the topic of Hider Ally. This was the burthen of all—"We want nothing of the Mahrattas, but their assistance against Hyder" In decency, he admitted they could not make a positive engagement to this effect, "But prevail upon them (added he) to invade his dominions; pretexts will not be wanting when they shall perceive the facility of making conquests upon him."

Hitherto the Mysore Chief, while he complained of the treatment which he received from the Presidency of Madras, had professed much respect for our other presidencies and the English nation in general; but on the publication of our violent declarations against him (for Mr. Hastings himself published them in the East, with his narrative of the insurrection of the Benares) he could not be blind to our plots for his destruction and therefore became an avowed enemy.

CHAP. II.

Views of Hyder Ally for his son—War with Governor Hastings—Hyder disappointed by France—Ill success of his supposed brother-in-law, Saddos Cawn—Hyder's conquests—Fraud and sources of wealth—Success of Tippoo on the Banks of Coleroon through M. Lally—Lally's humanity—Description of Seringapatam—Proceedings of Hyder and his allies—Treaty of peace between the English and Mahrattas—Defeat and Retreat of Tippoo—Vexation and Illness of Hyder—His death and character—Tombs of himself and family—Palaces, and the city of Bednore.

WHEN Hyder Ally and the Mahrattas involved the English Presidencies in war, Tippoo was a chief actor, being of a most active nature and ever ambitious of adventure; he was encouraged no doubt by his father, who spurred him on with large promises in case of success, having it in view to take Madras, depose the Nabob of Arcot, and place his son in possession of the Carnatic. Great as the wealth and revenue of Bengal were, they proved insuf-

ficient to supply the expences of this war. New sources were accordingly sought, and as usual the weak and wealthy were doomed to administer to the wants of the strong and warlike. The prosecution of the means of supplies introduced much calamity into Benares, and involved Mr. Hastings, then Governor General, in a new war, at about 600 miles distance from the seat of his government.

France had for some time, at an immense expence, been collecting a great force in her African islands, and all India was in expectation of the mighty blow which she was to give, and which it was supposed would have proved fatal to the British interests in that quarter of the globe. It was in this idea Hyder Ally first ventured to invade the Carnatic, and it was upon the same principle that notwithstanding his repeated defeats, he still rejected every overture that could be made tending to an accommodation. Probably all the aid he desired from France (excepting some artillery and engineers) was a sufficient naval force to crush that of the English, for he was little disposed to place any great confidence in the services of the French, or indeed of any European army in India; all he valued was their military knowledge and skill, as officers and engineers, for he did not wish that France or any other foreign nation should retain any kind of inland footing in the country.

Hyder's patience was greatly exhausted with the long delay of France to fulfil her engagements, while he was alone exposed to all the rigors of a dangerous war. But more greatly was he disappointed while indeed a'l India was astonished, when it was known that the French fleet, notwithstanding a considerable superiority of force, would not venture to attack the English in the open road of Madras, but on the contrary pursue the enemy where they were far superior to them, and in a hard fought battle encountering other disadvantages, besides a superiority of force, leave the claim to victory undetermined.

Hyder Ally, who had hitherto constantly invested Tellicherry on the Malabar coast, through despondency and depression on account of these recent disappointments, was now almost inclined to abandon that settlement. This place was preserved by Sir Edward Hughes, by a blockade, and Major Abingdon having arrived from Bombay with a considerable reinforcement of troops, a vigorous attempt was made to dislodge the enemy. Suddos Cawn, who commanded for Hyder Ally, retired with his family and the best part of his army into a strong fortified house, of a singular construction, it being scooped into the side of a hill, and the walls formed of a living rock. Here they made an obstinate defence, but after great slaughter this place was at length forced, and an inner 'recess,

which though wonderfully strong and so contrived as to be bomb proof, was not sufficient to save Saddos Cawn (who was severely wounded) and his family from being taken prisoners.

The European gazettes erroneously represented this man (Saddos Cawn) as brother-in-law to Hyder Ally Cawn, on account of a sister of his being in the prince's seraglio; but this is a kind of connection not at all considered as constituting any such degree of affinity.

Hyder was much grieved at this defeat, as the communications of the country were not only opened, but the enemy banished for several miles on each side of Tellicherry. He was also alarmed at the formidable appearance of the English in that quarter, from its vicinity to the rich kingdoms of Canara and Mysore, which were the great sources of his wealth and power. Hyder's possessions on the Malabar Coast had been partly acquired by conquest and partly by fraud, therefore the Nairs who were the native princes and nobility, and who had suffered the most in the ineffectual struggle for the preservation of their ancient rights and liberties, which till then had been unviolated, were exceedingly disaffected to his government.

Hyder's loss on the Malabar Coast was soon retrieved by Tippoo's success on the banks of the Coleroon. Having with vigilant attention discovered the situation of Col. Braithwaite, who lay

there with a detachment, Tippoo (who had been wonderfully successful in former attacks, especially one upon Colonel Baillie) was now stimulated to pursue other enterprises: in this expedition he was accompanied by Mons. Lally and 400 French, having 20,000 in his own army, the greater part of whom were cavalry. With these he suddenly surrounded Braithwaite's forces, who were unprepared for the unexpected attack. During twenty-six hours of three days, an unremitting fire of cannon and small arms were supported on both sides. The British commander and his officers (the former of whom, though severely wounded, could not be prevailed upon to leave the place of action) were not the least undaunted or discomposed, through the suddenness of the attack. Tippoo's design, in which he doubted not of success, was, by a violent cannonade, to scatter the British forces, and then rushing impetuously on the cavalry, destroy the whole: but the British sepoys, still retaining their order and firmness, defeated his purpose, and Tippoo after repeated attacks, was disappointed of all his sanguine hopes. M. Lally then advanced with a body of Europeans, against the poor wearied sepoys, who were then incapable of supporting another vigorous attack: a dreadful carnage ensued, and the fresh army naturally prevailed.

To the praise and honour of M. Lally be it remembered, that he issued immediate orders to

stop the carnage ; the infantry readily obeyed, but the cavalry being obstinate, he hastened personally, and with apparent danger to restrain their fury, and in this noble exertion, five of them fell by his own hand. He also prevailed upon Tippoo to commit the prisoners to his own charge, and behaved to them with the utmost care and tenderness. Some of the gallant British officers, notwithstanding, who were all wounded except one, were doomed to suffer the miseries of a cruel and tedious imprisonment in Seringapatam.

Seringapatam (the capital of Tippoo's family in the Mysore kingdom) lies on the Malabar coast, between Kaybye and Goa, surrounded with rocks and water, and therefore deemed a secure residence. Hyder was the first who enriched this island, and Tippoo considerably improved it. The best and shortest road from the Malabar coast is that which leads through the Coorga country. There is a safer conveyance by water from our several sea-ports.

This place is seated on an island about four miles long and a mile and a half broad, formed by a division of the river Cavery, which flows around it in two distinct channels. The fort is built on the western extremity of the island, where the Cavery commences its separation. On the eastern extremity, where the Cavery reunites its divided waters, stands the Laul Baug, or the royal garden, of which I shall

speaking hereafter. Formerly, a large and handsome town occupied the whole space between the fort and the Laul Baug, except a small garden situated on the northern branch of the Cavery which is called the Dowler Baug, or rajah's garden. The greatest part of this town was destroyed before the approach of the Confederate Armies in order to make room for batteries to defend the island, one portion of it only being suffered to remain, of about half a mile square, for the accommodation of the merchants and the convenience of the troops. This is called the pettah of Shahir Gangam: it is surrounded by a strong mud-wall, not very distant from the great garden. It is necessary likewise to observe, that on both sides of the two branches of the Cavery, out of the island, a considerable extent of ground is occupied by a bound-hedge, intended to mark the limits of the capital, and to afford a kind of asylum to the people of the neighbouring country in case of any hostile incursion. The enclosure beyond the southern branch of the Cavery was filled with inhabitants, but that beyond the northern entirely occupied by the Mysorean chief's army. Within this latter enclosure, which is in some space covered in part by a wide canal and by the winding of the Lackany river, six large redoubts had been constructed on high ground for the security of the island.

The buildings consist of brick and stone and

are very elegant; the men in general healthy and robust; the women more delicate, but strong and well made. They are fond of ornaments, and commonly wear white loose garments tied round the middle. The first-born of twins are from superstitious motives thrown into the sea, and agreeable to the Hindoo custom there are several *faithful* wives here who voluntarily sacrifice their lives on the demise of their husbands. The place is productive of various fruits, roots, rice, &c. The poorer class live chiefly on rice and fish, their meat being lean and unwholesome. They have several elephants and bullocks, and a great deal of wealth obtained chiefly by plunder from the Mysorean dominions. Mysore fell into the hands of Hyder Ally Cawn about the year 1763, Bednore between 1763-5, Soon-da in 1764, Malabar in 1765-6, Barah Mhal in 1764-5, the petty states of Hindoo Rajahs and of Purseram Bhow in 1774-7, Carnatic Belagout Bejapoory in 1776, Carnatic Belagout Hydrabad 1776-9. Tippoo on his accession to the throne, added Adoni, Sanore, Koorke, and Anagoondy. This ambitious prince, who was justly called the *Tyrant of the East*, inherited sovereign sway over a tract of country comprehending a space of not less than 80,000 square geographical miles, yielding a clear annual revenue of about three million sterling, after deducting all cursory expences; and peopled by upwards of

six millions of inhabitants, including for the defence of the whole about one hundred and thirty five thousand well-disciplined troops, together with a standing militia, very near one hundred and eighty thousand men; under various denominations.

The natives of Seringapatam are particularly tenacious of their religion, and will not mix with those of opposite opinions; these contrary opinions have been attended with much effusion of blood. Notwithstanding this place abounds in wealth, those who are high in office are the only persons in affluence. Monopoly was Hyder's delight, and Tippoo imbibed this churlish principle from his father.

Tippoo's success on the Coleroon totally disconcerted Sir Eyre Coote's plan for the conduct of the campaign; all the southern provinces were now open to the enemy, and a body of Hyder's troops joined some French forces who landed at Pondicherry, under the command of M. Duchemin. The combined enemy besieged and took both Cuddalore and Permacoil. They then meditated on jointly attacking Vandiwash. Sir Eyre Coote hastened to its protection, and holding a council of war, laid before them his own ideas, and the plan he had formed in order to draw the enemy from his present strong post to immediate action. The plan being approved of, he directed his

course to Arnee, in the strong fortress of which all Hyder's great magazines were deposited, which manœuvre succeeded; for Hyder who had abandoned his camp and retired to a secure position in the Red Hills, now immediately left it and marched to the relief of Arnee. In this battle, June 2, 1782, Hyder was routed and pursued till night, but the want of cavalry on one side, and the abundance of it on the other, prevented the grand effects of victory. Hyder, though defeated and obliged to fly, still remained unconquered, and was ever formidable and dangerous. In less than a week after the battle, a body of his chosen cavalry found means to draw the British grand guard into an ambuscade, and cut them entirely off before they could be supported by the army.

At this time both these great commanders. Sir Eyre Coote and Hyder Ally were taken ill. Though they equally escaped the dangers of the field, their lives were no doubt sacrificed to this contention. Hyder was a much younger man, and possessed an uncommonly vigorous and robust constitution, yet a series of unexpected difficulties and disappointments preyed upon his firm mind, and put his strong constitution to the test. His prospects were every day becoming more unfavourable, and affairs now seemed to be rapidly tending to a crisis. He had been able to bring desolation and ruin on the Carnatic, but

with all his power and exertions, failed in his greater purposes. He long considered the English as the only effective obstacles to the vast designs which he had formed in India. His ambition not only soared to the restoration of the Mogul Empire and its establishment in his family; but he confided in his own ability, for laying it out upon a more extensive scale, and fixing it upon stronger and more permanent foundations than those upon which it had been originally raised. The present weak and degenerate race of Mahometan Princes, who had sprung up upon the ruins of the fallen empire, he held in such contempt, as men unworthy of the situations in which fortune had placed them, and incapable of all the purposes, whether of war or of government: that so far from considering them as at all interfering with his views, he, on the contrary, held their wealth and their power as sure resources, to be applied as the occasion might require to their completion. The Mahrattas were the only native power which he apprehended, but having been so long in the practice of playing upon and managing those intestine divisions to which the nature of their government so peculiarly exposed them, that he did not despair of being able, either by money to render them alert, or by civil commotion incapable, till he had grown beyond their grasp or reach; but all these ambitious hopes were disappointed, and this grand scheme was en-

tirely disconcerted. The lingering war in the Carnatic afforded neither advantage nor hope, and if it was ruinous to his enemies, it was equally so to himself. He knew that a treaty of peace, and perhaps of alliance, was far advanced, if not already concluded between the English and the Mahrattas. He had every reason to suppose, that the intended partition of his dominions would be the band of union between these late enemies, who were both exceedingly jealous of his power, and had both suffered extremely by his arms. He saw that the English would now direct their whole force against him; that Bombay and Bengal would urge their utmost efforts against him on the Malabar side, where he was most vulnerable, and he had no further confidence in the French, who had already deceived him.

The treaty of peace which Hyder so much dreaded, was at length concluded with the Mahrattas, through the mediation of Medajee Scindia, and the negociation was conducted with considerable ability by Mr. Anderson. In art. 9, the Peshwah engages that Hyder Ally Cawn shall relinquish all the territories which he had taken possession of from the English, that he shall also release the prisoners he had taken, and abstain from further hostilities.

Bombay having dispatched a body of forces under General Matthews, to the coast of Malabar, in order to relieve Colonel Humberstone,

who had been obliged to retire with loss from Palacautcherry, Tippoo proceeded with the utmost rapidity from the Carnatic, in hopes of cutting him off, and in conjunction with M. Lally and a great force, attacked the British lines, but was gallantly repulsed with considerable loss, by Colonel Macleod. Tippoo suddenly broke up his camp, and returned by rapid marches to Palacautcherry, continuing his course back to the Carnatic. His defeat and retreat having reached General Matthews at Goa, he directed his views to an attack upon Hyder in the richest and most valuable parts: accordingly he besieged the city of Onore, which he took by storm, and a dreadful slaughter of the inhabitants of all ages and sexes.

The cause of Tippoo's sudden retreat is attributed to the then illness or death of his father; for his death had been kept concealed for some time, but is supposed to be about the close of the year 1782. He was certainly one of the greatest Princes, as well as the greatest warriors that India ever produced. His mind was so vast and comprehensive, as at once to reach to and embrace all the parts of war and government. It seemed as if all the qualities necessary to the foundation and permanency of a great empire were among the earliest seeds that sprung up in his mind; and that he looked forward from the smallest beginning, to that ul-

imate point which never departed from his view. The formation of such a native military force as India never beheld, and was thought incapable of producing; the conquest of great countries; and the acquisition of others without the sword; the raising of these to a degree of power and real value which they never before possessed, afforded but a moderate display of Hyder's talents and abilities. Besides the establishment of a mighty empire, and the reducing of the Europeans to their original state of merchants and factors, living as such entirely under the protection and government of the state, his vast designs reached not only to the becoming the greatest commercial power in Asia, but to what the East had never before beheld, the creation of an invincible navy, which should for ever secure the coasts of India from the invasions or insults of foreigners. If he was not a legislator, he had, however, the merit of establishing so mild and equitable a system of government in his dominions, that the new subjects of so many countries, were not only attached to his person in a most extraordinary degree, but the neighbouring nations showed on every occasion their wishes to come under his protection; excepting only from the foregoing part of this conclusion, that most singular of all people, the conquered Nairs on the Malabar coast, whose habits were invincible, though their bodies were easily subdued.

Hyder was no less redoubtable as a statesman, than as a warrior; and if his actions and the chain and motives of his conduct had not been too remote from observation to be thoroughly known and comprehended, he might possibly have been considered as one of the first politicians of his day, whether in Europe or in Asia. He was so far from being naturally cruel, that he differed in that respect from all the Eastern conquerors of whom we have any knowledge; but as he detested private treachery, and was a strict observer himself of the laws of war and of the public faith, and his punishments in the one instance, and his retaliations in the other, were so extremely severe, as to carry upon some occasions the appearance of cruelty and tyranny, especially with those who were not informed of the cause, or who were not disposed to consider the motives. Hyder despised and dispensed with, so far as it could with propriety be done, the vain pageantry and haughty pomp of the Indian courts, living in habits of great intimacy and familiarity with his friends, courtiers, and officers, displaying in his own person the frank manners of a camp, instead of the proud distance and austere reserve of an Eastern despot. He had been greatly through their own fault, and partly through their interference with his designs, a bitter and very nearly a fatal enemy to the English East India Company; but it would be disgraceful and mean

for his biographer on that account to suppress his virtues, or endeavour to conceal his great qualities. To enrich himself, however, he did not scruple to plunder and stain his character with acts of atrocity. These acts stamped him a tyrant, and he was always accounted more formidable abroad than he was at home.

Hyder Ally was the son of Nadim Sakir, and born at Deonelly, in 1728. This is a strong and elegant fort, the walls thickened round with hewn stone by European workmen; bastions and cavaliers defend each angle: there is also a magazine constructed with judgment and finished in a superior style. At a short distance to the westward of Coler, a small but neat mausoleum covers his and his wife's remains. Here also is interred his eldest brother, Ishmael Sahib. The tomb is a neat square building with a dome rising from its center. It is decorated with baskets of flowers and feathers and various trinkets, according to their superstitious tenets. Adjoining this tomb is a most beautiful garden, called Laul Baug: it is the principle nursery for the produce of Mysore; apples, oranges, grapes, guavas, plantains, coconuts, sugar-cane, with cotton, indigo plants, &c. It is surrounded by a high stone wall, and from the several plants and vines of different descriptions, rows of cypress, various trees and shrubberies, the religious veneration in which the shrine of Tippoo's ancestors had been held, was plainly marked.

Hyder began a palace in Bangalore, which is a place famous for public buildings. It is chiefly composed of wood with ornaments. After his death it was finished by his son, and deemed the most magnificent fabric in the east. But Hyder's royal favourite palace was in the capital of the Canara kingdom, Bednore, where the greater part of his wealth, and the treasures on which he had most set his heart were deposited. This city, the residence through many unknown ages of the most ancient and sequestered kings of Canara, had of late changed its name to Hyder Nagur, or the *Royal City of Hyder*, a name which the English did not then admit, and were in hopes of annihilating. This capital was to be ranked among the largest and finest cities in India, its extent being so considerable, that some of its streets run nearly in a right line two leagues in length, while its greatness was forgotten in consideration of its beauty. But its population was not proportioned to its extent, for being the favorite residence of the nobility, their spacious palaces and extensive gardens, inclosing vast basons or reservoirs of water (one of the most pleasing and favourite luxuries of the East) took up much and probably the greater part of the ground. The Christian religion had been early propagated, undoubtedly by the Portuguese, and still flourished so exceedingly in this city, that a majority of its inhabitants, estimated at 30,000,

were of that profession. The government and command of this place were lodged in the hands of Hyat Saib, who seems to have most worthily discharged the trust reposed in him ; and to have acted with a very extraordinary degree of judgment and policy in those measures which he pursued for the preservation of both the city and country from that impending ruin which probably no other Governor could have averted.

C H A P. III.

Tippoo's proceedings on the death of his father—His character—Intended invasion of the Bednore country—Misconduct of the English general—Massacre at Annampore—Hyat Saib taken prisoner and released—The Sundah country and Mangalore taken—Tippoo recovers his possessions—His revenge and barbarities to the English prisoners—Magnanimity of the sepoy's—Peace concluded between Tippoo and the English.

TIPPOO Saib, now Tippoo Sultaun, (being the first who assumed that title), on the death of his father, held a consultation with his brother Kerim

Saib, and gave different appointments to his two sons, Abdal Khalic and Tuffey Hyder, also Hyder Saib, one of his illegitimate sons. Among the most eminent of his chiefs were Syed Saheb, Syed Gofar, Meer Saduc, Cummer-ud Deen Cawn, Mootaub Khan, and Meer Allum Beheuder.

Having expatiated much on the character of Hyder, it is necessary to introduce the common opinion of that of Tippoo. From the example of his father he united all the qualities of a warrior and a statesman, but he inherited more of his turbulence and less of his policy. Young and enterprising, he was superior to his father in military talents, as he was inferior to him in the dissimulation of Indian politics; and nursed in conflicts with the English, from whom he had gathered his first laurels, it is no wonder that he felt a deeper resentment of their behaviour. He was also more addicted to grandeur and pleasure, and discovered stronger traits of despotism and cruelty. His father's virtues were not however buried in his tomb, for many of them still survived in his son.

The president and council of Bombay, now considered the invasion of the Bednore country no difficult task, from the supposed disaffection of Hyder's subjects, and the disorders which his death would occasion in every part of his dominions. Revolutions were expected, and indeed reported to have happened, and it being

supposed that Canara was in a distracted state, they imagined no extraordinary force necessary to induce the inhabitants to throw off or to reject the government of Tippoo Sultaun. Accordingly General Matthews received positive orders to make the attempt without delay on the confirmation of Hyder's death. After taking the Onore, this commander proceeded down the coast, and took the town of Cundapore with little loss or difficulty; but struck with the impracticability, or at least difficulty of taking Bednore, he communicated his apprehensions to the Government of Bombay: accordingly, but with reluctance, they relaxed their former orders, and gave him a discretionary power to proceed or defer the expedition as he found necessary. This commander had already taken his measures without waiting for any instructions, nor kept up any correspondence with Bombay. We are sorry to say, that as slaughter, cruelty, rapine and avarice had disgraced this expedition in its commencement at Onore, so the same detestable maxims and vices continued to stain its whole progress, until they were at its fatal conclusion most cruelly requited, when the innocent became indiscriminately with the guilty, victims to the rage of an exasperated and merciless enemy. Accounts, of this slaughter have been suppressed; indeed an officer at that unhappy instant tore to pieces in the face of the enemy, a regular detail which

he had written. The plan of Bombay to conciliate the good-will of the natives was by no means dopted; but all without remorse or pity were consigned to the bayonet.

An officer, who gives an account of the massacre at the fortress of Annampore, which was taken by storm, under some preceding circumstances of aggravation on the side of the governor, and from whence only one horseman, desperately wounded, had the fortune to escape the general slaughter, seems to feel no small compunction and horror, in describing the spectacle which was there exhibited, of four hundred beautiful women, all bleeding with wounds from the bayonet, and either already dead or expiring in each others arms! while the common soldiers casting off all obedience to their officers, were stripping off their jewels and committing every outrage on their bodies. Many of the women, rather than be torn from their relations threw themselves into large tanks and were drowned, The troops indeed were afterwards severely reprimanded for their enormities. This slaughter was occasioned by forcing a passage through the Gauts. It was understood at Bombay that the capital, the country, and fortress of Bednore with all the treasure and property, were to be delivered up to the English, that the inhabitants were to remain unmolested, and Hyat Seib continue in the government under the autho-

rity of the English, but still retaining as much power as before. It was however discovered that the General, upon getting possession of Bednore, violated all these articles, and made Hyat Saib a close prisoner. It is said the treasures found were immens^e, and that the breach between the general and Hyat Saib was soon after made up, and to the great astouishment of all, the treasures being claimed by Hyat as his own private property, were on that plea restored to him. The general now found leisure to forward dispatches to Bombay, wherein he charged his army, officers and soldiers, with acts of the highest criminality. It was however resolved to remove him from the command of the army, and appoint Col. Macleod in his stead, who was also to be joined by Col. Humberstone and Major Shaw.

The Sundah or Sounda county, on the upper part towards Goa, which Hyder had recovered from the Portuguese, was invaded and taken by Capt. Carpenter; but the chief expedition now was against the fortress and port of Mangalore, than which, none of all his acquisition had been dearer to Hyder, as all his sanguine hopes of becoming a formidable naval power were there centered. This town was taken without much resistance; the Killedar, or governor, fled with his people in to the fort, but a breach being made in 36 hours, he surrendered upon conditions.

Tippoo Sultaun was now determined to relin-

quish every other object and pursuit for the recovery of those valuable possessions. The English general accordingly applied for a reinforcement, a prodigious army commanded by Tippoo being at 45 miles distance. The general however with an inferior force attacked Tippoo, but losing five hundred of his men in a few minutes, he retreated to the fortress, and abandoned the city altogether.

Tippoo instantly enclosed the fort, and sent a detachment to attack the two Gaunts, which thro' bad conduct were shamefully lost. The fugitives that escaped from the Gaunts, communicated their own confusion and terror so effectually to the garrison of Cundapore, that they were instantly seized with the same apprehensions, and ran away, though no enemy appeared, in which unnecessary flight a great number of men and horses were drowned. A part of the garrison which had thus shamefully abandoned Cundapore, with its valuable provision for war, took refuge at Onore, and Captain Torriano could with the greatest difficulty keep his troops from being infected with their terror. He made a spirited but fruitless exertion to recover the artillery which they had abandoned. The unfortunate garrison of Bednore being greatly reduced in strength, were obliged after seventeen days of hopeless defence, to capitulate. They were, after some difficulty, allowed the honors of war, and

to retain (only) their private property. Tippoo was however resolved to gratify his indignation and revenge; for the morning after the troops had marched out of the fortress (April 28, 1783) and were led about a mile from Bednore, where they encamped, surrounded by some battalions of the Nabob's armed Sepoys, the general was sent for to meet Tippoo Sultaun without the town; but he and those who accompanied him, after some unknown examination, were put into close confinement, and never returned. In two days after the field and staff officers, with the captains, the paymaster, and the commissary, were all sent for and likewise detained. The buckshy, or paymaster, was then sent to the camp, when all the remaining officers were shamefully stripped and searched before him, and the money being found and taken, they were afterwards plundered of every thing, and no measures of humanity were longer observed with them or the troops. These ill-fated men were compelled to march sixteen days under a burning sun, almost naked, but loaded with irons, and driven without mercy like wild beasts to a fort in the interior part of the country where they underwent the most grievous and cruel imprisonment that ever was inflicted by the most savage race!—The general suffered a most violent death; it is stated by some accounts that melted lead was poured down his throat; other accounts say that scalding oil was thrown

over his body ; and others, which seem to be the best information, that he was forced to drink the poisonous milk or juice of a shrub, by which he died in the greatest agonies. Several of the principal officers were likewise barbarously murdered. The poor Sepoys endured all the calamities of a long, hopeless captivity, with wonderful patience, and withstood all the allurements and threats of the tyrannic victor; nobly refusing to sacrifice their faith and attachment, by entering into his service.

After the reduction of Bednore, Tippoo now resolved on the recovery of Mangalore. France at this time had concluded a peace with England, and he was by no means pleased with her conduct. as it was without his concurrence, or at least including him in the treaty. Convinced of the insufficiency of his army without the French troops, he insisted that no treaty whatever in which he was not a party, should release them from their engagements; and it was supposed that he intended to retain and force their services : however he did not proceed to this violent extremity, but dismissed them with much dissatisfaction. The siege of Mangalore was hereupon converted to a blockade; a cessation of arms took place afterwards, but through want of provisions the garrison were reduced to great distress: and though a peace was in agitation, it seemed that Tippoo was in great hopes of starv-

ing them into a surrender, but was obliged, on the arrival of General Macleod, who came with a strong force from Bombay, to consent unwillingly to their receiving a supply. Carwar, Onore, and some other forts, as well as Mangalore, still continued in the hands of the English, until by the peace concluded between the Company and Tippoo Sultaun in the following year; a general restitution of the conquests on both sides took place, and the tranquillity of India was for the present fully restored.

CHAP. IV.

Tippoo's disaffection to the English notwithstanding his treaty—Enquiry into the cause—Motives for a fresh war—The Rajah of Travancore purchases of the Dutch the forts of Crangenore and Jacottah—Tippoo enraged, attacks him—England interposes—Summary of the debates in the House of Commons respecting these hostilities.

TIPPOO accepted the proposals of pacification, as he then found it expedient for his own affairs, but as his future conduct proved, he only waited

for a favourable opportunity to distress, and if possible banish the English from his territories. The hostile disposition evinced by our governors, from the first establishment of his father's power, could not but have fixed a suspicion and dread of us, not to be removed by the wiser and more equitable administration of one man. He had too much reason for the greater part of his life to consider the English as the unalterable enemies of his family and throne : it was natural, therefore, that after our last intrigues with the Mahrattas, he should draw closer his alliance with the ancient enemies of England. If, on the other hand, our intentions were upright and sincere, we could only regulate our conduct by that of his. All who administer public affairs are under the despotic controul of existing circumstances. He who acts with conscientious integrity as they direct, performs his duty. Some reference may be had to the past, but if we formerly endangered the safety of another, no sense of justice directs us in return to betray our own. We certainly did not seek the pretext of a quarrel. It is true, we refused to aid the Mahrattas in the invasion of Mysore, and though we had too much reason to suspect, yet we did not hastily resent the Sultaun's evasion of the article in his treaty, by which he stipulated to liberate all his English prisoners ; but it was impossible to overlook his designs, when he publicly sent a splendid

embassy to the court of France. But the revolution of France was at this time in embryo, and almost ready to explode; of course her distracted condition prevented any unfriendly interference. Spain likewise, though she began to be then jealous of our new settlements and commerce, which were now just commencing in the South Seas, would not venture alone to provoke the might of Great Britain. Still it behoved the English to be vigilant, and anticipate as far as they could, and when in justice they might, the effects of a combination, which other times might call into action, injuriously, if not fatally to their interests in the East.

The following is a summary account of the ostensible ground of a fresh war with Tippoo Sultaun. For a hundred and fifty years the Dutch had been in possession of two forts, Cranganore and Jacottah, which they took from the Portuguese, who had been masters of them for nearly the same length of time. They are situated between the country of Mysore and Old Cochin, their most valuable settlement in India. Cranganore, from its vicinity to the boundary of the Mysorean kingdom, was deemed by Tippoo's father a place of considerable importance, which induced him, previous to his rupture with the English, to seize and garrison it, under pretence that it belonged to his tributary, the Rajah of Cochin. However the Dutch contrived to recover

it, and of their conduct on this occasion the enraged Nabob made great complaint. In 1789 Tippoo Suldaun laid claim to the forts, which claim he was determined to support by arms. In June he advanced towards Cranganore with a formidable force, and the avowed intention of recovering it. The Dutch, alarmed at these preparations, immediately proposed to sell both the Forts of Cranganore and Jacottah to the Rajah of Travancore, an ally of the British government, who accepted their proposal, depending no doubt on the assistance of England, in case of an attack from the Eastern Chief. Tippoo, enraged that this purchase was made without his consent, insisted the forts were his by right; and pretending that some of his rebel subjects had found refuge in the Rajah's dominions, he collected a powerful force, (Dec. 29) and commenced a sudden attack upon the lines or boundary of Travancore. England could not possibly be indifferent to these proceedings; though we had no right to decide on the justice of the opposite claims without the consent of both parties, yet even a disputed title in an acknowledged ally, was sufficient to warrant us in protecting him by arms against an armed aggression, especially from an ambitious monarch, who at that very time was suspected of plotting the total destruction of the British empire in India. These were England's motives for interfering and renewing a war with Tippoo.

In the House of Commons, Dec. 22, 1790, Mr. Hippesley, in consequence of an allusion in his Majesty's Speech to this business, moved, "that copies of the correspondence relative to the attack of Tippoo Sultaun on the lines of Travancore should be laid before the House." He stated, "that the Rajah of Travancore, who was our ally, had purchased the Forts of Cranganore and Jacottah of the Dutch. Tippoo Sultaun objected to the legality of this purchase, asserting in his own right a feudal claim to the forts in question, as sovereign of Mysore. The Rajah having peremptorily refused to relinquish the forts, Tippoo marched towards the Travancore lines, the boundaries of the Rajah's territories, and commenced hostilities. Such was the simple statement of the fact. But before we took up the cause of the Rajah, he contended that we ought to consider whether Tippoo's claim might not be founded upon laws agreeable to the established feudal system of India. and whether the Rajah himself had acted in such a manner as to be entitled to our support. Cranganore was situated north of Travancore and Cochin. Cochin had been indisputably tributary to Hyder Ally, and he believed to Tippoo. Cranganore was probably in the same predicament; the presumption was certainly in favor of such a supposition, as most of the little rajahships on that part of the coast had been at some time or other tributary to the Mysorean

Chief. The circumstance of Cranganore's having been in the possession of the Dutch, was observed to be of no consequence, as still it might have owed fealty to Tippoo. The Rajah of Travancore had long wished to obtain these forts, and had applied about two years before to Sir Archibald Campbell, then Governor of Madras, for permission to negotiate a purchase, but Sir A. Campbell expressed his direct disapprobation of the measure. After that gentleman had left India, the Rajah wrote to his successor, Mr. Hollond, briefly observing that he had completed the purchase of these forts with the concurrence of the British government. In such a transaction there appeared on the part of the Rajah more deceit than honor.

“ In defence of Tippoo's conduct it might likewise be fairly argued, that it was impossible for him, as Sultaun of Mysore, to behold with indifference the transfer of these forts to the Rajah. Cranganore, in the hands of the Dutch, a mere trading company, was of little importance; but in the possession of an active ally of the British government, it assumed a very different aspect. As he questioned the justice, so he had his doubts of the policy of the war. The Mahrattas and the Nizam were to be our allies, but little dependance he thought could be placed on either. Mahratta faith was as proverbial in India, as the *punica fides* had been in

ancient Rome. And could we, he asked, so easily forget the general confederacy of 1780 among the native powers ; a conspiracy, headed by the Nizam himself, the object of which was to exterminate the British nation from India ?

“ On the subject of resources, he remarked, that Tippoo had an army of 150,000 men, a large corps of Europeans, well officered, and an admirable train of artillery. He possessed a revenue of five millions, and could boast a treasury of at least eight or nine millions. To all this what could we oppose, but an exhausted treasury and a tottering credit ?”

Mr. Francis seconded the motion, and argued against the impolicy of extending our territories in India, and of forming alliances with the native princes of that country. He observed, “ that there existed a mutual jealousy between Tippoo and the Nizam, which it was our interest to encourage. But the Marhattas were the power which we had the most reason to dread. It would therefore be extremely unwise to extirpate Tippoo, if his extirpation depended upon our will, as such a circumstance would give the Mahrattas an extent of territory, and a degree of influence, which might prove highly dangerous to the British interests in India.”

Mr. Dundas stated, “ That Cranganore, Jaccottah, and Cochin, were places of considerable strength in the hands of the Dutch. That

politic people, being alarmed at the warlike preparations of Tippoo, pointing towards the quarter in which these possessions were situated, became desirous of making over the forts of Cranganore and Jacottah to the Rajah of Travancore, whom they knew to be our ally; that by thus, in effect, throwing themselves under the protection of the British government, they might raise a barrier to Cochin, their most valuable possession on the continent of India. After the purchase was made, Tippoo Sultaun set up a sort of claim to the forts in question, by way of obtaining a pretext for his hostile proceedings. But this was not the first time that his ambitious views had been manifested. In 1788 he advanced with a formidable army to the frontiers of Travancore, without the least provocation on the part of the Rajah; and was with difficulty induced, notwithstanding the spirited remonstrances of the British government, to retire to his own dominions. He was represented as a restless tyrant, ever bent upon schemes of aggrandizement, and ever viewing us with a jealous and a hostile eye. We had on our part most religiously kept the treaty of Mangalore, but he had continually shewn an inclination to violate it." Mr. Dundas further remarked, "That how numerous soever our adversary's troops might be, and whatever might be his revenues, we had little to fear on that head, as our army in India

was perhaps the finest that had ever appeared in that part of the world; and as instead of supporting a war against the French, the Dutch, the Mahrattas, all the European and all the native powers, we should contend with only one of them."

Mr. Fox, in supporting the grounds taken by Mr. Hipplesley and Mr. Francis, said, "that he trusted a war for conquest would never be undertaken by England, either in India or in Europe."

The motion passed without opposition, and (Feb. 28) Mr. Hipplesley moved "That the 35th clause of an act made in the 24th year of his present Majesty, which disavowed all schemes for the extension of our territories in India, might be read; and that the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 23d, and 44th resolutions of the House of Commons, on the 15th of April 1782, might be likewise read." He then quoted several extracts from the correspondence of the government of Fort St. George, in the year 1768, 1770, and 1771, tending to prove "that it would always be our best policy to regard the Mahrattas with a distrustful dread, and to preserve at any price the friendship of the Sultaun of Mysore."

Mr. Hipplesley now observed, "that previously to entering upon the grounds of the war, the members of opposition severely animadverted on the treaties of offensive and defensive alliance which had been recently concluded with the Mahrattas

and the Nizam. As Tippoo's invasion of the territory of Travancore, was allowed to be the origin of the war, it was remarked that the defence of the Rajah, the reparation due to him, and his future security, ought to have been particularly provided for in those treaties, but that in fact he was not once named in them. Not a single word occurred which alluded to the cause of the quarrel, or from which it might have been inferred, that the interests of the Rajah were ever thought of. We could only collect from them, that Tippoo was a common enemy, that having had engagements with the three contracting parties, he had acted with infidelity towards all, and that we ought to deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity in future. The question of our interference was stated to be simply this, Whether by an act of guarantee, expressed or implied, in the treaty of Mangalore, we were bound to defend the Rajah of Travancore in these dominions only, which he possessed at the date of the engagement, or to extend our protection to subsequent acquisitions made by him without our consent or knowledge? Upon the supposition that we were bound to defend him in those dominions only which he possessed at the date of the engagement, (a supposition certainly the most reasonable) there could not exist the least possible occasion for our involving ourselves in the business. But arguments were

not only brought against the necessity of our interference, but against the justice of it. The Rajah was said to be the aggressor, and not Tippoo. In support of this opinion, several extracts were quoted from the correspondence of our governor in India, one of which was to the following effect: "That the Rajah, by engaging
" in new connections with the Dutch, and by
" making conclusive purchases of forts or places in the territories of one of the tributaries of
" Tippoo Sultaun, (*viz. the Rajah of Cochin,*)
" not only without his consent, but even at the
" time when such tributary was threatened with
" his resentment, upon himself, and by the same
" transaction forfeit all right to the Company's
" friendship or interference in his favour."

That the Rajah acted under the consciousness of being engaged in an unjust and dishonourable transaction, appeared from the duplicity which he practised towards the British government, for the Court of Directors declared that nothing existed on the Madras records to corroborate his assertion, of having obtained our consent to the purchase; Sir A. Campbell positively denied that he had ever given such consent; but observed that he had absolutely signified his entire disapprobation." In the course of this debate, the impolicy of the war was strongly urged: it was contended that we would do better to support the Mysorean power, than attempt to anni-

hilate it—that our means were unequal to the expences of an Indian war—that the governors of India themselves confessed that our revenues were exhausted, and that the importance of the places in dispute could not compensate for the serious consequence of hostilities;—that in the single article of bullocks, it was supposed we should incur an annual expence of £700,000.

It was contended on the other hand that an attack had been actually made by Tippoo Sultaun on the lines of Travancore, which we were bound by the treaty of Mangalore to resent—that the conduct of the Rajah had not been such as to justify our desertion of him, but whether or not, it would be imprudent to give him up to Tippoo's vengeance. That his pretended claim to the forts was not the real origin of the war, for before he had made this complaint, he had attacked the Rajah's lines : and should he ever be master of these forts, there would be an end of our security in the Carnatic. That instead of considering the Mahrattas as our natural enemies, we should esteem them as our best and most useful allies. That it was the enterprising and unprincipled usurper of Mysore, who was the only Indian Chief we should dread. It was also contended—that a peaceful negociation was impossible, for that it was attempted at the commencement of the dispute ; but during the very period when the messengers were on their way to Madras with

letters. professing amity and peace, Tippoo repeated his attacks—it was therefore urged, that the war was as much founded in justice as in policy.

March 22, Mr. Dundas read the following resolutions :

“ That it appears to this House, that the attacks made by Tippoo Sultaun on the lines of Travancore on the 29th of December, 1789, the 6th of March and 15th of April 1790, were unwarranted and unprovoked, in portions of the treaty entered into at Mangalore, on the 10th March, 1784.” *

“ That the conduct of the * Governor General of Bengal, in determining to prosecute with vigour the war against Tippoo Sultaun, in consequence of his attack on the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, was highly meritorious.”

“ That the treaties entered into with the Nizam on the 1st of June, and with the Mahrattas on the 7th of July 1790, were wisely calculated to add vigour to the operations of war, and to promote the future tranquillity of India; and that the faith of the British nation was pledged for the due performance of the engagements contained in the said treaty.”

These resolutions passed without a division.

In the House of Lords, April 11, Lord Portchester's motions *against* the war were negatived

* Lord Cornwallis.

by a majority of 77. Lord Grenville's motions for the war were carried by a majority of 52.

CHAP. V.

Tippoo attacks the Rajah of Travancore—succeeds, and then fails—Has a narrow escape with his life—his reply to the British governors—repeats his attack—bears down all opposition, and puts the Rajah's army to flight—the English interfere to humble the proud tyrant—are joined by the Mahrattas and Nizam—arrangements—Tippoo's alarm and hasty departure from Travancore—his letter to general Meadows—the answer—various captures by the English—the undaunted conduct of the Killedar of Dindigul—Tippoo's consummate generalship—embarrassed situation of Colonel Floyd—instances of Tippoo's skill, policy, and cruelty.

TOWARDS the close of the year 1789, Tippoo Sultaun marched a powerful army to the lines of Travancore, with the professed intention of wresting from the Rajah the late purchased forts of Cranganore and Jacottah.

The kingdom of Travancore is so favoured by nature as to be accessible only to an enemy on its northwest frontier ; and even that but for an inconsiderable space. To render this exposed quarter as secure as possible, the lines were formed about thirty years since, which consist of a ditch sixteen feet broad and twenty deep, with a thick bamboo hedge inserted in it, a slight parapet and a good rampart and bastions almost flanking each other. Their extent from the coast, where they commence, to a broad river called Chinamungulum, is four or five miles, and from the opposite side of the river to the Elephant Mountains, where they terminate, about twenty-five miles. They run in a direction nearly eastward.

Dec. 29. Tippoo suddenly attacked the eastern extremity of these lines, and made himself master of the adjacent height. Thence doubling and advancing with rapidity towards the centre, he seemed to carry all before him. His triumph however was of short duration. The Rajah's troops being recovered from their first apprehensions, and animated by the example of a small body consisting of about 800 men, which forming in a narrow pass withstood the whole force of the assailants, returned to the conflict with new spirit, and succeeded at length in completely routing the Mysorean army. Tippoo, who was personally engaged in the battle, narrowly escaped

with his life. His horse was shot under him ; and in repassing his lines, so great was his hurry and trepidation, that he leaped with violence against the bamboo hedge, which was in the ditch, and considerably bruised himself in forcing his way.

An application was now made to Tippoo by our governors in India, whom the Rajah informed of this sudden attack. They remonstrated against the impropriety of his proceedings, and observed, that as the Rajah was an ally of Great Britain, they should think themselves bound to resent an invasion of that prince's dominions ; but that if Tippoo would consent to an amicable adjustment of point in dispute between himself and the Rajah, they would send commissioners to meet any whom he might appoint, on the borders of their respective territories, whose joint decision should be final to both parties. Tippoo Sultaun replied, " that if they would send confidential persons to him, with whom he might hold a personal conference on the subject, he doubted not but that he could explain himself to their satisfaction." This answer was not deemed sufficient, and no other steps were taken for an accommodation.

Tippoo having procured from Mysore an additional supply of troops and battering guns, repeated his attack, and after some weeks, having made a considerable breach in the walls, advanc

ced to the storm, and bore down all opposition. The Rajah's troops, filled with consternation and dismay, fled in every direction from the Mysorean bayonets. Complete master now of the lines, he immediately turned his attention to the fort of Cranganore, which (May 7, 1790) was besieged with vigour and soon carried.

Tippoo having now extended his dominions to an alarming magnitude, active preparations for war were making in the British settlements, and the present moment was deemed most favourable to humble this prince's pride, and reduce his empire within safe and reasonable limits. The Mahrattas and Nizam cheerfully joined the English, and promised a zealous co-operation. General Medows assumed the command of the grand Carnatic army, consisting of near 15,000 effective men, and General Abercromby that of Bombay.

The following was intended to be the plan of the campaign. General Medows was first to possess himself of the Coimbetore country, which would not only cut off one of Tippoo Sultaun's principal resources, but afford sufficient supplies for the remainder of the campaign; and from that quarter, if possible, to penetrate into Mysore, through the Gujelhatty pass, while General Abercromby was to attempt the reduction of the Sultaun's territories, west of the Gaunts; and, if circumstances required or permitted it, to form

a junction with General Medows. The safety of the Carnatic was entrusted to a small army under the command of Colonel Kelly, stationed in the country between Madras and the passes leading to Mysore.

Tippoo, alarmed at the actual appearance of the British army near the frontiers of his most valuable possessions, hastily retired from Travancore. He hurried back with a small body of troops to his capital, leaving the remainder of his forces either to reascend the Gauts, or to act in the low country as circumstances might direct. To avert the impending storm, he immediately wrote to General Medows, congratulating him upon his appointment to the government of Madras, and proposing to send him certain confidential persons, to explain, as he observed, several important circumstances, "that the dust which had obscured the general's upright mind might be removed—"

General Medows immediately returned an answer to the following effect :

"I received yours, and understand its contents. You are a great prince, and but for your cruelty to your prisoners, I should add an enlightened one. The English, equally incapable of offering an insult, as of submitting to one, have always looked upon war as declared from the moment that you attacked their ally, the King of Travancore. God does not always give the

battle to the strong, nor the race to the swift, but generally success to those whose cause is just.—On what we depend !”

June 15. General Medows now marched from the plains of Trichinopoly, where his army was first embodied, and entering the enemy's country, took possession of the fort of Caroor. After a halt of eighteen days, for the purpose of collecting grain, and forming a magazine at Caroor, he proceeded to Daraporum, and captured it without opposition. At this place he resolved to form a *depôt*. Accordingly he left here four companies of Europeans, with a detachment of 200 sepoys, as a garrison, and disencumbering himself of all superfluous baggage, pushed on to Coimbetore, which he found evacuated. This place had formerly been the capital of a powerful and independent rajah, but had submitted with all its rich appendages to the Mysorean arms. Still however there remained some traces of what it was. Hitherto the English encountered no other opposition than that of different bodies of looties (irregular horse) that from time to time harassed their march : But intelligence being received on the day after the capture of Coimbetore, that one of the Sultaun's most able generals, Sahid Saheb, was approaching towards Demiacotta, about 40 miles from Coimbetore, with near 3000 regular cavalry, a detachment was instantly dispatched to surprise them.

The detachment soon returned, having only succeeded in taking about fifty of the enemy prisoners.

X It was deemed highly necessary, previous to the projected invasion of Mysore, to establish a chain of posts from the Coromandel Coast to the foot of the Gujelhatty pass. The line of country which seemed best for this purpose, extended through Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Caroor, Erroad, and Sattimungulum. It was therefore immediately resolved to reduce such forts in this line as were not already in our possession. Pallicautcherry and Dindigul likewise, although situated in a different direction, were judged necessary stations, particularly the former, which opening towards the low country of Callicut, commanded the communication between the eastern and western Gauts.

Agreeable to the plan, Colonel Oldham was sent against Erroad, which he captured after a trifling opposition. Colonel Stuart, about the same time, headed a detachment which proceeded against Dindigul. Captain Aram, who was then on his way from Madura to the camp, was ordered to join Colonel Stuart, or even to attempt alone the capture of Dindigul on his advance, either by surprise, stratagem, or negotiation, as was most practicable. Pursuant to his directions, he reconnoitered the fort, but found it much stronger than he suspected. Notwith-

standing, he summoned the Killedar to surrender, pledging himself that private property should be respected; but declaring, if they obstinately persisted in an idle defence, it was the commander in chief's determination to put the whole garrison to the sword. The person who brought this summons, received the following verbal reply from the undaunted Indian:

“ Inform your commander that it is not possible for me properly to account to my sovereign for the surrender of such a fort as Dindigul. If therefore a second messenger comes with a similar errand, I will blow him back again to his comrades from my cannon's mouth.”

On the arrival of Colonel Stuart's detachment, batteries were erected, and this fort very heavily cannonaded for two days. A storm was projected the second day, and attempted the same night. But notwithstanding the assailants pushed on with the utmost gallantry, the garrison repelled every effort to carry the works. Attack succeeded attack, but so strongly was the place fortified by nature and art, and so ably defended, that after a long and fruitless contest, the British troops retired to their camp and left the Mahometans still masters of the ramparts. Early in the morning, however, a white flag was displayed in the breach, in token of a disposition to surrender; for, after the spirited defence of the preceding night, the Killedar had the mor-

tification to find himself in the morning deserted by almost all the garrison; the very men who had so nobly distinguished themselves. He then proposed and obtained an honourable capitulation. Colonel Stuart now proceeded to Palli-cautcherry, which he captured after a short and feeble resistance.

Colonel Floyd was at the same time sent against Sattimungulum, which he surprised and took without bloodshed. This post was of considerable importance, from its situation near the Gujelliatty pass, through which a passage was to be effected into the heart of the enemy's kingdom.

The whole chain of posts being now completed, and considerable magazines already formed in some of them, the moment seemed approaching for the invasion of Mysore. At this critical period, the Sultaun's army suddenly appeared in the neighbourhood of Colonel Floyd's encampment. Tippoo on this occasion discovered such consummate generalship, that his near approach was not in the least suspected, until he had actually descended the gauts at Gujelhatty, forded the river Bovany, and was within a few miles of the British camp. This secret march was the more remarkable, as his army consisted of 40,000 fighting men, and at least twice that number of followers, provided with an immense artillery, and a very considerable stock of provisions. A-

bout 300 cavalry going out on a reconnoitering party, to their great surprize, fell in with 6 or 7000 Mysorean horse, with which, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers. they maintained a long and sharp conflict, until the arrival of reinforcements enabled them to put the enemy completely to flight*; but in a few hours after, the little camp itself was cannonaded by the whole of Tippoo's force. A vigorous action succeeded, and continued through the remainder of the day; but in spite of the Sultaun's great superiority both in men and artillery, he was not able to break the British ranks. At the close of the action, when the enemy retreated for the night, a council of war was held, and it was immediately determined to abandon our new acquisitions in that quarter, and return with all possible expedition to Coimbetore, where the grand army still remained.

The next morning (Sept 14.) at four o'clock the troops began to retreat, leaving behind a part of artillery, which they were unable to take away from the scarcity of bullocks in their possession. They had scarcely proceeded twelve miles, before they again perceived the Mysorean army in their rear. They now left another part of their artillery and several tumbrils, in order to march with

* Lord Cornwallis in his letter to the Directors, which we shall give in the succeeding chapter, mentions this attack as if he thought it could have been avoided.

greater expedition; but still Tippoo gained ground upon them. A distant cannonade commenced, which was attended with but little consequence. No serious action took place till four o'clock in the evening, when the engagement became general, and lasted till seven, at which time Tippoo retired from the field, being very nearly beaten. They reached Velladi the next day, unpursued by the enemy. This masterly retreat gained Colonel Floyd much credit, as likewise did the spirited behaviour of the troops, who with inflexible constancy of mind endured most bitter hardships, having fasted and marched for three successive days, and lain on their arms during the whole of the intervening nights, without murmur or complaint.)

✓ The intelligence of this sudden attack having reached General Medows, he hastened to the relief of the detachment, for the safety of which he was extremely apprehensive; but by mistake he passed Colonel Floyd while at Velladi, and pushed forwards within a few miles of Demiacotta, ignorant that the Colonel had abandoned his advanced post at Sattimungulum. As soon as Tippoo understood that General Medows was proceeding northwards with the main army, he instantly fell back, and having re-crossed the Bovanay, took a strong and judicious position on the banks of that river.

General Medows being informed where Colonel Floyd now was posted, did not enterprize any

thing against the Sultaun, but marched back to Velladi, and having formed a junction with the Colonel, returned to Coimbatore.

In a few days after, (Sept. 29) he proceeded again northwards, in hopes to overtake the wary foe and give him battle. But Tippoo's movements were in general so secret and rapid that the British camp knew but little of him. From the superiority, as well as number of his bullocks, and the great supply of his elephants, he was able to elude the most diligent search, and change his positions with such silence and celerity, as astonished all his adversaries. He was at this time bending his course towards Caroor. in order to intercept a convoy of provisions under the command of Major Young. but contrary to what usually happened. General Medows was apprized of Tippoo's present design, and by an early junction with Major Young, which was not accomplished without much exertion, he disappointed the enemy's views. No sooner was this fortunate junction effected, than intelligence arrived that the enemy had invested Daraporam; the garrison of which being totally unfurnished with cannon, very shortly capitulated. The General, now alarmed for the safety of Coimbatore, once more hastened back to that important post, and had the pleasure on his arrival, to find that Colonel Hartley, who had previously arrived at Palacautcherry, had thrown into it a seasonable

reinforcement, at a very critical period, and in all probability preserved it.

Tippoo now quitted his position at Daraporam, and returned to the north, encamping not far from the Bovan, between Sattimungulum and the Cavery. At this period it was thought most prudent to form a junction with the central army, which had been left for the defence of the Carnatic, under Colonel Kelly, but was now commanded by Colonel Maxwell, in consequence of that officer's death. It is not known whether Tippoo had any foreknowledge of this intended junction at the time he took this admirable position. but certain it is, he could not have occupied a better, either to intercept Colonel Maxwell, then advancing southwards, or if necessary, secure his own retreat to Mysore. But he did not long keep his station here, for the British army approached (October 20) which occasioned him to quit his post, and adopt a route which would in all probability enable him to fall in with the Carnatic army. His adversaries followed him more from chance than any previous knowledge of the line of his march, for as both parties wished to meet Colonel Maxwell on his way from the Barramaul valley, it is no wonder that they should both take a similar route. The British army at last, after a long and occasionally difficult march conceived that they were on the point of forming the wished for junction, as they

plainly discovered before them tents and flags. Three guns were fired in the line on this supposition, as a signal; but to their great astonishment the flags were lowered, the tents disappeared, and the whole army in front hurried with precipitation towards the Gauts. In fact, it was Tippoo himself, who had previously appeared for three successive days in line of battle before Colonel Maxwell; but who fearing to attack that commander, so well prepared and securely posted, was now returning unsuccessful from his expedition. Both the British armies shortly after joined, (November 17) at Paolampatty, without any further opposition from the enemy.

Tippoo finding those forces united, whom he dared not attack singly, wisely changed the plan of his operations, and by alarming the English with the apprehensions of losing their own dominions, hoped to draw off their attention from making conquests on his. Therefore, instead of returning to Mysore, he directed his course southwards constantly taking the lead of the British general. However, in spite of the astonishing expedition with which he usually marched, he was overtaken by the van of the British at the pass of Tapoor, and unexpectedly attacked with vigour, but no considerable advantage was obtained over him, his cavalry covering the flight of his infantry with so much courage and skill.

The English now abandoned all idea of invading Mysore at this time. They did no more now than watch the Sultaun's manœuvres, and prevent him from ravaging their territories. Tippoo was directing his course towards Trichinopoly, but could not effect his purpose, from the swoln state of the river, before he learned that General Medows was advancing to its relief. He then suddenly changed the line of his march, and passing through part of the Carnatic, besieged Tiagar; but notwithstanding he lay before it seventeen days, and expedited his operations to the utmost of his power, he was not able to make any impression on the garrison, which baffled all his attempts of capturing it. He left Tiagar nine days before General Medows arrived there. Thence he proceeded to Trinomaly, where he made some Brahmins of eminence prisoners---exercised the utmost cruelty, seized their property, burnt their dwellings, and defiled their altars. He then turned aside towards Chitteput and Wandiwash, and made himself master of Permacoil, a small fort in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, which had been taken, dismantled, and blown up in the last war.

General Medows followed Tippoo no further than Trinomaly, from which place he moved forwards to Arnee, where he left General Musgrave with the left wing of the army, the sick, heavy

guns, &c. and marched himself with the right wing to Vellout, about eighteen miles distant from Madras.

C H A P. VI.

Further success of the British arms,—Tippoo's consternation — Account of the capture of Bangalore, in a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Honourable Court of Directors—A message from his Lordship to Tippoo—His noble reply.

FROM this change in the movements originally intended, Lord Cornwallis was convinced that a diversion on the Malabar coast might be attended with beneficial consequences: General Abercromby then resolved to embark, with the little force that could be spared from Bombay, for Tellicherry, and see if an attempt could be made with propriety to clear the country of a force stationed by Tippoo Sultaun to awe the garrison of Tellicherry, and curb the Nairs; who were universally disposed to join the English.

On the general's arrival, (December 5) he was informed that the force to the southward of Telli-

cherry, had assembled and had marched towards Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, at that time ordered to Paniani to keep the communication open. General Abercromby found it impracticable to give Colonel Hartley assistance till Cannanore was reduced. The government of that district had, during the rains, made a treaty with the chief of Tellicherry ; had evaded a compliance with the articles ; had invited a force stationed by Tippoo in the Cherical country, and which had retired at the opening of the campaign, to return to their defence ; and had at length openly avowed their hostile intentions.

On the 10th the general encamped on the heights of Egar, and was joined on the 12th and 13th by the neighbouring rajahs and about 2000 irregular Nairs. The next day they moved towards the enemy, who were strongly posted on heights to the southward, and eastward of Cannanore, defended by a chain of stone redoubts with cannon in them. The General, on viewing their position, resolved to gain possession of every redoubt in the centre of their posts, and early the next morning demolished their defences, and obliged them to evacuate the place. He then attacked the height of Carley, which surrendered at day-break on the 16th. The general was now in possession of the heights and works to the southward, and could completely prevent the enemy's retreat. Convinced of their danger,

they offered to capitulate. Articles were agreed on, and hostages received. The Cannanore troops, amounting to 800 men, retired within the town, and Tippoo's forces paraded in front of their encampment, and agreeable to the terms that had been granted, surrendered their arms and all Circar property, and engaged not to serve during the war. They were upwards of 5000. The fort of Cannanore was summoned immediately afterwards, and surrendered without conditions. The fort of Biliapatam also surrendered in the evening; and the garrison received the same terms with the rest of Tippoo's troops.

In the mean time, Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, with his little detachment, had completely defeated and dispersed the corps opposed to them, and were in possession of Turuckabad, the capital of Paniani. He then marched to Ventzitty Cottah, where the enemy's force that was posted, amounted to 10,000 men. On his approach they retreated, and the fort surrendered. The enemy were found posted in a wood in the front of the village of Tervanangurry. Being attacked, they retreated, having disputed the ground, which was full of hedges and mud-banks. They then formed in front, and in the flanks of the fort of Trincalore, but the English obliged the fort to surrender, and totally dispersed them. Upwards of 800 were taken in the fort. Mootaub Khan, who commanded them, retreated to Turuckabad,

and left it the next day with about 2000 men and a considerable sum in specie, and fled to the Gauts. Lieutenant Colonel Hartley advanced to that place, and the remains of their army laid down their arms. A considerable quantity of military and other stores were captured, and in particular the guns taken from the Travancore lines.

The forts of Berragurry and Cootahpore in the in the Cartanad country, still remained in the possession of Tippoo's troops. A detachment was now sent against them, who returned in ten days with 400 prisoners, whom they had taken without any loss. The fort surrendered with little opposition, on nearly the same terms as Cannanore.

Such was the success of the British arms, which gave Tippoo Sultaun no small consternation. but the chief thing which chagrined this eastern tyrant, was the capture of Bangalore, and the attending consequences; an account of which Lord Cornwallis gives in the following letter addressed to the Honourable Court of Directors:

“ I shall not trouble your honourable court with an explanation of the nature of the incessant exertions, both of body and mind, which are required by the various duties of my present situation, nor should I now have alluded to them, but that I am under the indispensable necessity

of stating them, as the cause of my being obliged, on this occasion, instead of entering into a detail of particulars, to limit myself to a concise and general account of our late operations, and of our future intentions.

“ Our preparations for the campaign having been completed at Madras, the army marched from Velhout on the 5th of February, and having reached Vellore on the 11th, we halted there two days for the purpose of drawing from thence a supply to my stock of provisions, and an addition that had been prepared to the battering train ; and of receiving some stores, and recovering men from Arnee.

“ I had, previous to my arrival at Vellore, employed every means in my power, to obtain accurate descriptions of the different passes that lead into the Mysore country ; and having seen sufficient grounds to be confident that the Moogly pass could easily be rendered practicable, I turned off to the right at Vellore, and not only ascended the pass without much difficulty, but, by having taken a route that Tippoo does not seem to have expected, I was also lucky enough to advance a considerable distance into his country, before it was possible for him to give us the least obstruction.

“ The forts of Colar and Ouscottah lay in our route to Bangalore, and surrendered to us without resistance ; but, as neither of them were in

a tenable condition, nor at that time of any value to us, I left them unoccupied, after disarming and dismissing their small garrisons.

“ I arrived before Bangalore on the afternoon of the 5th of March, and on the 6th, the engineers were employed in reconnoitring the place, both in the morning and in the evening. On their latter excursion, Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, who escorted them with the whole cavalry, discovered the rear of Tippoo’s line of march, apparently in great confusion; and unfortunately suffered himself to be tempted by the flattering prospect of striking an important blow, to deviate from the orders he had received from me, and to attack the enemy. His success at first was great, but the length and ardour of the pursuit threw his squadrons into great confusion. In this state they were charged by Tippoo’s cavalry, and being out of the reach of all support, they were obliged to retire with great precipitation, and with the loss of about 200 men and near 300 horses. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd received a very severe wound in the face, from which however I have the pleasure to add, that he is now perfectly recovered.

“ The ill success of our examination, the fear of losing time, and many other circumstances, of which the hopes of obtaining a supply of forage was not the least, induced me to determine immediately to attack the fort from the Pettah

side. The Pettah was accordingly assaulted and carried on the morning of the 7th, und the siege of the fort, which was rendered singularly arduous, not only by the scarcity of forage and the strength of its works and garrison, but also by the presence of Tippoo and his whole army, was happily terminated by an assault on the night of the 21st, in which the Killedar and a great number of his garrison were put to the sword, and our loss in proportion to the nature of the enterprise was extremely inconsiderable. I cannot however help expressing, on this occasion, my sincere regret for the death of the brave and valuable officer Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse, who was killed at the assault of the Pettah on the 7th of March.

“ I have not yet been able to obtain correct lists of the ordnance, or of the different articles that were found in the magazines of the place; and I can therefore only say, in general, that there were upwards of 100 serviceable pieces of ordnance, near 50 of which were brass, a large quantity of grain, and an immense *depôt* of military stores.

“ Although Tippoo approached our position, and even cannonaded the camp, both on the 7th and 17th, yet on these occasions, and on all others during the sieges, he took his measures with so much caution, as put it effectually out of my power to force him to risk an action; and on the night

of the assault he retired, in great haste, from the south side of the fortress where he was then posted, immediately upon his being acquainted with its fall. After giving some repairs to the breaches, making a number of necessary arrangements, and leaving the train of heavy artillery to be refitted during my absence, I moved from Bangalore on the 28th. with the design of securing a safe and speedy junction with a large body of cavalry that the Nizam had promised to send me, and of receiving a reinforcement of troops, and a supply of provisions and stores which I had some time before ordered to be in readiness to join me, by the way of Amboor, from the Carnatic, considering those as necessary preliminary measures for enabling me to proceed to the attack of Seringapatam : and I, at the same time, communicated my intentions to General Abercromby, and directed him to use every exertion in his power that might be consistent with the safety of the corps under his command; to prepare himself in the manner that I prescribed, to give me effectual assistance when I should reach the enemy's capital.

“Tippoo having made a movement to the westward, on the same day that I marched from the neighbourhood of Bangalore, I fell in with his rear at the distance of about eight or nine miles from that place ; but from the want of a sufficient body of cavalry, it was found im-

practicable, after a pursuit of considerable length, either to bring him to action, or to gain any advantage over him, except that of taking one brass gun, which, owing to its carriage breaking down, he was obliged to leave upon the road.

“ My first object being to form a junction with the Nizam’s cavalry, I made such movements or took such positions as I knew would effectually prevent Tippoo from intercepting them, or even from disturbing their march ; but although I was at great pains to point out the safety of the march to Rajah Teige Wunt, and to encourage him to proceed, the effects of my recommendations and requests were but slow ; and after waste of time, which at this late season of the year was invaluable, and which almost exhausted my patience, this junction was not made till the 13th instant.

“ It is not easy to ascertain the number of the corps with precision, but I suppose it to amount to fifteen or sixteen thousand horse : and though they are extremely defective in almost every point of military discipline, yet as the men are in general well-mounted, and the chiefs have given me the strongest assurances of their disposition to do every thing in their power to promote the success of our operations, I am in great hopes that we shall derive material advantage from their assistance.

“ This junction being accomplished, I marched

on to effect my next object without loss of time ; and having arrived at my present camp on the 18th, and ordered the most expeditious measures to be taken for transporting the stores from the head of the pass, I shall commence my march again to the westward on the 22d, and after calling at Bangalore for my heavy artillery, I trust that I shall find it practicable to reach Seringapatam before the 12th of next month.

“ No useful purpose could be promoted by my enumerating the difficulties which I have already encountered in carrying on the operations of this campaign, and it would be equally unprofitable to enlarge at present upon the obstacles which I foresee to our future progress : they are however of so weighty a nature, that under different circumstances I should undoubtedly act with more caution, and defer the attempt upon the enemy's capital till after the ensuing rains ; but acquainted as I am with the unsettled situation of political affairs in Europe, and knowing that a procrastinated war would occasion almost certain ruin to your finances, I consider it as a duty which I owe to my station and to my country, to disregard the hazard to which my own military reputation may be exposed ; and to prosecute with every species of precaution, that my judgment or experience may suggest, the plan which is most likely to bring the war to an early decision.

“ I have at the same time been the more encouraged to persevere in the execution of my original intentions, as both the Nizam and the Mah-rattas have of late shown an uncommon alacrity in fulfilling their engagements, which by the smallest appearance of backwardness on our part, would be immediately cooled, and which I trust will in addition, to our own efforts, essentially contribute to counteract many of the disadvantages which the difficulty of the march, the risk of scarcity of provisions and forage, and the approach of the rainy season, present against the undertaking ; and if those obstacles can be overcome, the capture of Seringapatam will probably in its consequences, furnish an ample reward for our labours.

“ A few days after our success at Bangalôre, Tippoo repeated his propositions to open a negociation for terminating our differences ; but whether with a sincere desire to obtain peace, or with the insidious hopes of inciting jealousies in our allies, by inducing me to listen to his advances, is not certain. The line for my conduct however was clear ; and conformable to our treaties, I declined in civil and moderate terms to receive a person of confidence, on his part, to discuss the separate interests of the company : but informed him, if he should think proper to make propositions in writing for a general accommodation with all the members of the con-

federacy, I should, after communicating with the other powers, transmit our joint sentiments upon them.

“ I shall refer you entirely to the accounts that you will receive from the different governments, of the details of their respective business; and shall only add, that the personal attention that I have experienced from the members of the supreme board, and the zeal which they have manifested since I left Calcutta, in promoting the public good, has given me very particular satisfaction.

“ The Swallow packet will remain in readiness to be dispatched in August, or sooner, if it should be thought expedient; and I shall, by that opportunity, have the honor of writing fully to you on several of those subjects, on which you must no doubt be anxious to receive minute information. I cannot however conclude this letter without bearing the most ample testimony to the zeal and alacrity which have been uniformly manifested by his majesty's and the company's troops, in the performance of the various duties of fatigue and danger in the course of this campaign, and assuring you that they are entitled to the most distinguished marks of your approbation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

*Camp at Venkettigherry,
April 21, 1791.*

CORNWALLIS.”

Respecting the Killedar, an old and faithful soldier of Tippoo's, who was killed in the contest, a circumstance occurred which deserves to be mentioned as remarkably illustrative of the Sultaun's character. Lord Cornwallis sent a message to the Mysore chief, informing him that the body of the Killedar, who was slain in defence of the fort, should be transmitted to him, if he desired it. The Sultaun's answer was truly magnanimous.—“I consider,” he replied, “that spot of ground which the body of a soldier covers, when he falls in the execution of his duty, as the most honorable which can be chosen for his grave.”—The British commander accordingly had him interred in that spot, with all military honors.

Several manœuvres had been practised by Tippoo's generals with adroitness; wild bullocks were continually driven among the English troops, which had the desired effect of throwing some into confusion, and tossing others in the air.

C H A P. VII.

Tippoo's unwarrantable measures of cruelty—Assassination of three European prisoners—Story of Hamilton—Inhuman murder—Proceedings of each army—Tippoo pursued—Alarming state of the bullocks—Lord Cornwallis's mortifying retreat—Tippoo attempts a negociation—Union of the British and Mahratta forces—Gallantry of the Killedar of Maddore—Termination of the second campaign.

DISAPPOINTMENT and vexation now prompted Tippoo to unwarrantable measures of cruelty. Piqued at the bold proceedings and success of Lord Cornwallis, and in order to prevent certain discoveries, this vindictive chief ordered the assassination of three prisoners who had been for some time in close custody in his dungeon at Oussore. His conduct in this instance has been attributed to a spirit of revenge after his recent losses at Bangalore ; but probably it originated in motives of policy. He had repeatedly and solemnly declared that no Europeans were retained against their will in his dominions. When therefore the tide of his affairs was rapidly turning against him, he seems to have adopted this barbarous measure simply to prevent the discovery of his own falsehood and treachery.

One of these unfortunate prisoners, Hamilton, was an officer in the British navy. He despaired of freedom, and had contracted an intimacy with a female of Mysore, by whom he had a family: having happily acquired a thorough knowledge of their language, he toiled for their maintenance in the capacity of a carpenter. When the order for their execution came, the killedar was supplicated by the surrounding people to spare the poor wretches lives. Hamilton's distress family pleaded hard in his behalf; the tears of his wife and children now prevailed, and he was given to their entreaties. The other two were beheaded with the sabre, and their heads severed at one blow. On the capture of Bangalore, the order for Hamilton's death was repeated; ineffectual now was all supplication—he took leave of his children and their distracted weeping mother—then, submitting himself to the executioner's stroke, suffered with unparalleled fortitude. But either through a desire to double his sufferings, or through pity for his more lamentable situation, the executioner was not so dexterous as before, for he repeated the blow before he cut off his head!

It was Lord Cornwallis's intention to march immediately to Seringapatam, after the important fortress of Bangalore was completely subdued; but his lordship prudently deferred this favourite measure, till he had formed a junction with the Nizam's cavalry, which, as his letter demonstrates,

occasioned much delay. He had also been promised a supply of provisions, by some northern Poligars, who had recently revolted from their allegiance to the Sultaun : at the same time he was also in expectation of receiving further supplies which he had ordered from Caroor. With such objects in view, he left Bangalore, and marching to the north, had the good fortune to succeed in all his wishes. The Poligars furnished him with all he stood in need of, but were afterwards severely punished by Tippoo for their treachery. At the edge of the Gauts he met with the party from Caroor, who, besides an additional supply of provisions, brought him a reinforcement of 700 European, and 4,500 native troops. Thus crowned with success, he returned to Bangalore.

While the main army was thus honorably employed, General Abercromby was marching towards Mysore, with the hope of sharing the honors of the war. He reached Poodicherrum pass, opposite to Cannanore (March 1), where he was directed to remain till further orders. Being desired to quit that situation, he proceeded immediately to Periapatam, about three miles distance from Seringapatam.

His lordship having arranged every thing to his mind, set forward on his expedition (May 3) against the Sultaun's capital. The roads through which he passed were in several places deep and

rugged, and had been rendered considerably worse than usual by the fall of an immoderate quantity of rain, which at this season was quite unexpected. After a fatiguing march, during ten days, being obliged to wade through great waters and encounter many difficulties, he arrived at length at Arakeery, which is distant from Seringapatam about nine miles.

Tippoo, who had been already four days at his capital, was from this situation perceived to march out of the island on which that town, is built, and to take possession of a strong post in the front of it. The direct approach to the position which was thus occupied on the side of Arakeery, was through a very narrow valley, full of swamps and ravines. His lordship, deterred by this circumstance from making an attack in this direction, determined to conduct his troops by a circuitous route round the hills, with the hope of surprising Tippoo in his camp, or at least procuring more equal ground for a contest.

This hazardous expedition was undertaken at eleven o'clock at night; when it was so very dark and stormy, and the roads almost inaccessible, that at day break he found to his great mortification he had made but a short progress. Still he pushed on in profound silence, much disappointed, but not dispirited; and actually arrived within three miles of the enemy's camp, before the least alarm was given. His near approach being

at length perceived, a large body of the enemy was immediately put in motion, and dispatched to occupy some high ground, commanding a deep ravine, through which he was still under the necessity of passing. Unfortunately this spot was seized at the very time that the British troops were descending on the other side towards the ravine. Some guns were now brought to bear from the height, which for a while damped the British ardour; at last the troops after a delay of full two hours, formed on the other side of the ravine, and were during that time dreadfully exposed to the enemy's fire. Indeed their lines must have been greatly discomposed, had it not been for a rocky eminence which happily afforded them some shelter.

It was deemed expedient, before any disposition could be testified for action, to dislodge the enemy from the height. Colonel Maxwell was appointed to this task, who with one column of the army pushed forward with so much spirit, that he soon became master of the eminence, the whole army then followed, and the action became general. Colonel Maxwell pressed the enemy on the left flank; Colonel Floyd with the cavalry on the right; while General Meadows, with the line under his command, attacked in front. Tippoo, notwithstanding his personal exertions in the field, was obliged to give way, and was pursued until he took refuge under the

batteries of the island. Lord Cornwallis, after this fortunate action, encamped on the very spot where the contest had terminated.

Now it was expected that measures would be concerted for the reduction of Seringapatam. But his lordship thought it prudent still to defer this enterprise, until he could form a junction with General Abercromby, who was then at Periapatam waiting for orders. He deemed it expedient to have an army capable of keeping the Sultaun in check on the southern side of the island, while he forced his passage over the Caverry on the northern side. He imagined that without such assistance he might have been exposed, in attempting the passage, to a cross fire from a strong fort not very distant from the ford over which the passage might have been forced, and from the main army of the enemy, which might have otherwise taken a favourable position for such design. After a halt of two days he forsook with this view his new post, and marched the army to Kanambaddy. On account of the weak state of the bullocks, they only advanced seven miles the first day, and twelve the second. The condition of these useful animals was now minutely examined; and it was found that their number was alarmingly diminished, and that several of those which were still living were almost incapable of service, through the extreme fatigue which they had en-

dured, but more particularly an epidemical disorder that had lately broken out among them. It likewise appeared that the stock of provisions in hand was inadequate to the probable consumption of the army for a longer period than would be sufficient to take them back to Bangalore. These galling circumstances obliged his lordship to relinquish the fair prospect in view, and abandon for the present a wish that now almost seemed within his grasp. He therefore instantly dispatched orders to General Abercromby to return to the Malabar Coast. Accordingly that general but with great reluctance left Periapatam, where he had been only four days and fell back towards the western Gauts, after having destroyed a part of the battering train which had been destined for the siege of Seringapatam.

May 26th his lordship commenced his mortifying retreat, but had scarcely proceeded six miles from Kanambaddy Fort, when a party of strange horse unexpectedly rode in on the baggage flank. They were supposed at first to be enemies, but to the great joy and surprise of the army, proved to be the advanced guard of a powerful Mahratta force, which was marching with all possible speed to the support of the British troops. This force consisted of two considerable armies; one under the command of Purseram Bhow (a celebrated Mahratta warrior) amounting to 20,000 horse and foot, with two battalions of Sepoys; the other

under Hurry Punt, a Bramin of the highest rank, to the number of about 12,000 men.

Tippoo, previous to the actual junction of the confederates, attempted to open a negotiation with Lord Cornwallis. He sent for this purpose a numerous retinue of servants with large presents and letters: but his lordship declined the acceptance of the former, and answered in general terms to the proposition for opening a negotiation, that without the concurrence of the allies, no step of this kind could be taken.

Now the British army, united with the Mahratta forces, were no longer in dread of a scarcity of provisions. But it was too late now to make any attempt upon Seringapatam, as the heavy guns had been destroyed when the retreat was determined; the periodical rains were also setting in, and moreover General Abercromby had already descended the Gauts. This enterprise was therefore relinquished for the present, and it was resolved in the mean time to establish the head-quarters, during the monsoon, in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, that supplies might be there collected for more effectual operations against Seringapatam when the season would permit; and that the confederate forces, by carrying the war into the northern districts of Mysore, might in some degree, during the interim, subsist at the expence of the enemy.

They found, on their return to Bangalore that the fort of Maddore was taken and destroyed. The gallant killedar of Outradroog was summoned, but returned the following noble answer, " That he had eaten Tippoo's salt" (meaning that he had received his pay) " for twenty years, and was resolved not to surrender the fort entrusted to his care, till Seringapatam itself was captured." Savendroog was next reconnoitred, but not invested. A separation took place at this time in the combined armies: Lord Cornwallis, with Hurry Punt and the Nizam's cavalry proceeded to Bangalore, while Purseram Bhow marched to the north-west, towards Sera. And thus, what may be termed the second campaign of the war, terminated.

C H A P. VIII.

*Preparations for another campaign—A journal found relative to the unfortunate prisoners—Tippoo attempts another negociation—The ambassador dismissed, to the satisfaction of the allies—Capture and description of Nundry-doo—Tippoo's enterprizes and manœuvres—Recovers by a second attempt Coimbatore—Refuses to ratify the terms of capitulation, and orders the English troops to be brought as prisoners to Seringapatam
 ----Depredations----Description of the Rock of Death----Various successes of the different parties----Final junction and arrival of the allied armies near Tippoo's capital.*

HIS Lordship on his arrival at Bangalore, did not remain inactive during the rainy season, but constantly turned all his thoughts to hasten and secure the necessary preparations for commencing the next campaign with increased vigour. His first object was to open a communication with the Carnatic. The Muglu pass through which he had penetrated into Mysore, was thoughtless adapted to this purpose than that of Policode. He therefore determined on imme-

diately reducing the forts which might oppose the passage of the convoys; advancing by this route from the Carnatic to Bangalore. For the prosecution of this plan, he set out towards Oussore, (July 15) through a country in high cultivation, which had been hitherto exempt from the calamities of war. The enemy at his approach evacuated the fort, but had not time to carry off all the stores. A journal was here found, which corroborated the story of the three unfortunate English prisoners in the preceding chapter. The inhabitants who told the piteous tale with much simplicity and compassion, pointed out their graves, and curiosity being excited, they were opened, and the headless trunks of the poor wretches discovered, who from their hair and clothes were evidently Europeans.

Hence his Lordship proceeded to Rayacottah, which after a slight resistance to the detachment that was sent against it, immediately at the approach of the main army surrendered. This was followed by the reduction of all the hill-forts in the neighbourhood of the Policode pass, Anchittydurgam, Neelagheri, Rutnagheri, Oodeadurgam, and Chinraydurgam. Three of these were destroyed, and only Anchittydurgam, and Oodeadurgam kept and garrisoned.

For some time the army continued in the neighbourhood of Oussore, in order to cover a convoy, which was daily expected from the Carnatic, and

which arrived in perfect safety, (August 10) and brought a supply of one hundred elephants, and six thousand bullocks laden with rice.

Tippoo, before the army moved from this position, made another unsuccessful attempt at a negotiation. Being distressed on every side, and probably despairing of effectually creating a jealousy among the members of the confederacy, it was now understood that he consented to treat with the allies as well as the British government.

His ambassador was by birth a Mahratta, but so far from being acceptable to his countrymen, that Lord Cornwallis was obliged to give him a guard to protect him from their resentment. Previous to a declaration of his master's sentiments on the object of his mission, he proposed certain conditions with respect to the forms of his reception, with which it was judged highly improper to comply; but not being instructed to dispense with the observation of such forms, he declined entering into any negotiation whatever, and much to the satisfaction of the allies, was, in consequence, immediately dismissed.

Now, as the communication with the Carnatic was opened and rendered secure, his lordship next resolved to establish a communication with the country of the Nizam, from whence important supplies might also be procured. The principal forts which were situated between this country and Bangalore were Raymanghur, Ambagee-

Durgum, Chittum-Cottha, Nundry-doog and Calarum-Conda.

September 14, a detachment, under Major Gowdie, was dispatched upon this service. Ray-manghur made some resistance, but surrendered at discretion, after a vigorous assault of a few hours. Ambagee-Durgum and Chittum Cottha submitted on the first summons. The capture of Nundry-doog afforded a wider field for the display of British valour. This is a capital of an extensive district, and is seated on the summit of a lofty mountain, at least 1,700 feet high, accessible only on one side, where two walls and an outwork had been erected for its protection.

Against this formidable fort, strengthened by new works, and garrisoned with some of Tippoo's best troops, Major Gowdie with but a handful of men, intrepidly advanced. In consequence of the distance of his batteries, little success attended his first attempt. Not discouraged, though much disappointed at the little impression which he had been able to make, he immediately determined to ascend the rugged mountain itself, on the only side by which it was practicable, and erect his batteries upon it. After 14 days incessant toil and hazard, at length he completed his object, and breached the walls; but still the commandant refused to surrender. Lord Cornwallis at this moment sent a reinforcement under general Medows to make an assault, if neces-

sary: while the whole army moved to a post within four miles of the fort. An assault being resolved, some person, immediately before the troops advanced on this difficult and dangerous enterprize, observed that a mine was supposed to be near the breach. General Meadows with a spirit and presence of mind, which few in similar circumstances could have displayed, replied instantly, "that if a mine was really there, it could only be a mine of gold," and rushed without delay to the breach. The assailants were terribly annoyed, not so much by the fire of the garrison, as by immense fragments of stones which were rolled from the summit of the hill, and perpetually bounding from the solid rock, came down with an impetuosity, hardly to be conceived. Yet in spite of every obstacle, the works were at length carried. This capture occasioned the surrender of the remaining fort Calarum-Condada, without opposition.

In the mean time, the unfortunate Sultaun attempted to regain what he had formerly lost in the southern districts of his dominions. A very inconsiderable force was stationed in Coimbatore, under the command of Lieutenant Chalmers. Tippoo accordingly directed his views to this point, and flattered himself that he might happily recover at least one of the rich gems, which had been lately ravished from the Mysorean empire. He dispatched therefore, immediately after the retreat

of the British army from Seringapatam, a small body of troops to Coimbetore, which, after a fruitless attempt to storm the fort, were driven back to the very confines of Mysore, with loss and disgrace.

Tippoo, notwithstanding, did not abandon the enterprize. As soon as the care of his convoys gave him leisure, (which was not until the month of October) he sent Cummer-ud-Deen Cawn, his second in command, with a far superior force: at the same time enjoining that General, after his descent into the low country, to dispatch immediately a detachment to Kistnaghery, in the Barra-maul, the only place of any consequence which he retained between Bangalore and the Carnatic. By this manœuvre, he hoped to intercept the British convoys, which would scarcely expect to find an enemy advancing against them by so circuitous a route.

His general, Cummer-ud-Deen soon appeared before Coimbetore, and commenced a vigorous siege. Major Cuppage, who was stationed with a small force at Palacautcherry, advanced immediately to the relief of the fort, but finding he was not able to cope with so superior an enemy, and dreading lest his retreat should be cut off if he ventured to attack the Cawn, fell back again to Palacautcherry. Now with redoubled ardour the siege was pressed, un-

til Lieutenant Chalmers, deprived of all hopes of relief, agreed to capitulate.

The terms of capitulation were, that the garrison should march out of the fort with the honors of war, and should be immediately sent to Palacautcherry, with permission of going from thence to the Carnatic, on their parole, where they were to remain during the war.

As soon, however, as the Cawn took possession of the fort, he informed Lieutenant Chalmers, that the terms of the capitulation could not be valid, till ratified by Tippoo Sultaun. This Tippoo refused to do, and ordered the prisoners, with Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, to be brought to Seringapatam. The detachment, principally consisting of light horse, which the Cawn had dispatched to the Barramaul, not finding the convoys which the Sultaun hoped to intercept, plundered and ravaged the country. When Lord Cornwallis heard of these depredations, he sent Colonel Maxwell to oppose them. The chief rendezvous of the enemy, was a strong mud fort, called Ponagra, which the colonel assaulted, captured, and blew up. Having scoured the Barramaul to the south, he proceeded against Kistnaghery, which contains two forts and a pettah. His object seemed to be to destroy the lower fort and pettah; with this view it was assaulted in the night. The garrison instantly fled to the upper fort, where a party of the assailants rashly ven-

tured to follow them, but were repulsed with considerable loss. The lower fort and the Pettah were now destroyed, and Colonel Maxwell having executed his orders in the Barramaul, returned to the main army.

Lord Cornwallis thus successful in every quarter, began now to think more seriously of the chief object of this campaign. But to prevent the necessity of a second retreat, in the very moment of victory, from a possible deficiency of supplies, he first determined to attempt the reduction of the forts situated in the country between Bangalore and Seringapatam; the most important of which were Savendroog and Outradroog.

The former of these is so well fortified by nature and art, that it has been thought impregnable. It is built on an immense rock, arising to the perpendicular height of a mile from a base, which is said to be nine or ten miles in circumference. It is secured on every side by many thick and well disposed walls and barriers, which seem to defy all idea of hostile approach; while the summit of the rock, which is separated by a deep chasm, is crowned with two distinct citadels, capable of affording shelter to the garrison, if driven from the lower works. The atmosphere of the surrounding country is conceived to be extremely unwholesome, and that from this circumstance, it derived the name of Savendroog, which signifies *the Rock of Death*.

The detachment sent against this formidable fortress, (December 10) was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stuart. He was supported by the main army encamped in the neighbourhood. The artillery was dragged through woods and up precipices with incredible toil and perseverance, before batteries could be erected with any prospect of success. At last, this labour being ended, the batteries soon began to open, and in a few days effected a breach. Then commenced the assault, and notwithstanding the difficulty of the enterprize, it was crowned with most extraordinary success.

The lower works were carried without opposition, and so great was the consternation of the garrison, that they abandoned at the same time the fortification on the eastern summit of the mountain, all crowding to that on the western summit. Their ruin was occasioned by this circumstance: for the steepness and ruggedness of the rock in this part, so retarded the fugitives, that a body of our troops found means to enter the gates of the western hill with them, and thus became complete masters of both submits. In this assault the English did not lose a man, although the enemy left almost three hundred, killed and wounded, on the rock.

Colonel Stuart now proceeded from Saven-droog against Outradoog, which in the late retreat was ineffectually summoned. The Killedar

refused a second time to surrender, and even fired on the flag of truce as it advanced, to prevent all kind of communication. However, the garrison seemed little inclined to support his efforts, and deserted in considerable numbers. The fort was stormed, and carried without any loss, two privateers only being slightly wounded. The Killedar also was taken prisoner.

While Colonel Stuart was employed in reducing Outradoog, a small detachment was dispatched against Kam Gurry, and Sheria Gurry, both which were captured; the former having made but a slight opposition, and the latter having surrendered at discretion.

There is little importance in the proceedings of the armies of the Nizam and Mahrattas, which separated from his Lordship. The Nizam's was employed in the siege of Gurramcondah from August to November, when it succeeded in carrying the lower fort. However, the main army moving from that neighbourhood, to join Lord Cornwallis for the protection of the Carnatic convoys, there were only a small body of troops left at Gurramcondah, which were suddenly attacked and defeated by Hyder Saib, the Sultan's eldest illegitimate son. On the return of the main army, the lower fort was again captured, which terminated its operations under the final junction with Lord Cornwallis.

The Mahrattas first attempt was upon Kin-coopy, a hill fort about eighteen miles from Chittledroog, which was attended with no success. As the country west of Chittledroog and Chinroy-patam, including the fertile provinces of Bidenore and Mangalore, was almost the only part of the Sultaun's dominions that had not smarted under the scourge of war, he had stationed a considerable force there, for the purpose of protecting the supplies which he might find necessary to draw from that quarter. Purseram Bhow, notwithstanding this circumstance, was determined to advance against Simoga and the forts on the river Tum and Badra. Hooly Onore and Bankapoor were subdued without much difficulty, but on approaching Simoga, he found a Mysorean army encamped before it of greater strength than had been imagined. Still he ventured to attack it, and the fort shortly after capitulating, was completely victorious. He was much indebted for this extraordinary success, to the good conduct of Captain Little, and the gallantry of three Bombay battalions under his command.

Thus successful, the Bhow turned towards Bidenore, but here he found Cummer-ud Deen Cawn already posted, with an army capable of stopping his triumphant progress. Wisely abandoning this new project, as it would have been too hazardous to try his strength with the Cawn,

he proposed to return, and form a junction with General Abercromby agreeable to a pre-concerted plan: but unfortunately, he was too late. Thus his expedition to Bidenore was not only unproductive of advantage, but rather tending to disadvantage, as it deprived the allied troops of his co-operation, where it had been promised, and where his strength might be of considerable service.

His Lordship had placed much dependence upon the Bhow's crossing the Cavery in time to join General Abercromby, and the disappointment obliged him to make several alterations in his original plan, though the ready cheerfulness shewn by Azeem ul Omrah (the Nizam's minister) upon his junction gave him hope that no great deviation from it would be necessary.

His Lordship was encamped at Outradoog, when he was joined by the Nizam's forces. All the supplies and reinforcements which were upon a larger scale than any that had been sent in former wars, were now arrived. After some military parade in exhibiting the British line to the Indian chiefs, who appeared highly gratified by so novel a sight; the allied armies proceeded a second time on their expedition to the capital, in the neighbourhood of which they arrived (February 1, 1792) on the fifth day of their march, and without the least opposition from the enemy.

C H A P. IX.

Commencement of the third campaign—General consequences of nocturnal attacks—Meeting of the divided parties—Tippoo's embarrassment—His perseverance and fortitude—His unsuccessful attempts, and consequent mortification—Tries for an immediate peace, and releases the captive officers—His duplicity—He meditates in the mean time, the death of Lord Cornwallis—His commissioned assassins disappointed, and make their escape with precipitation—Negociation for peace opened—Hostilities still continue with slaughter—Siege commences—Orders issued for its termination—Terms of Peace—The humbled Tippoo submits—His two sons delivered up as hostages—Their reception—Behaviour—Dress, &c.—Definitive treaty settled—Lord Cornwallis's attention to the Princes—Character of Abdal Khalic.

LORD Cornwallis the very day after his arrival, determined upon an immediate attack on the Sultaun's fortified camp. As soon as the troops were dismissed from the evening parade, orders were immediately issued for a general assault the same evening. Every thing was in

readiness by half after eight, and the troops commenced their march in profound silence. They advanced in three divisions; the right commanded by General Medows, the centre by Lord Cornwallis in person and assisted by Colonel Stewart, and the left by Colonel Maxwell.

Lieutenant Colonels Cockerell and Nesbitt were attached to the right, Lieutenant Colonels Stuart and Knox to the centre, and Lieutenant Colonel Baird to the left.

The allies appeared under the greatest astonishment and consternation, when they observed Lord Cornwallis venture his person in all the dangers and uncertainties with which a nocturnal expedition seemed pregnant, but likewise order out his troops without cannon, on so formidable an enterprize.

The enemy received the first alarm from the centre division, who unexpectedly fell in with a body of Mysorean horse, proceeding with rockets, and other implements of Indian war, to disturb the camp of the allies; but not until it had arrived within a short distance of the bound hedge. Pressing on rapidly, it soon entered the enemy's lines, under a heavy but ill-directed fire. The Mysoreans fled on every side, ignorant of the numbers, and dreading the bayonets of their assailants.

The front column of this division, which had been ordered, if possible, to cross the Cavery

with the fugitives, fully executed its orders, but in consequence of the confusion and hurry which generally attend nocturnal attacks, it separated unintentionally into three parties. The first party that reached the river put itself under the command of Captain Monson, as senior officer, and crossed a ford near the East angle of the fort. Immediately on gaining the island, Captain Monson pushed for the fort; but the eastern gate was unfortunately shut, and the bridge drawn up. Disappointed in his hope of surprising the fort, he passed on through the middle of the island, until he arrived at the other side of it, taking post partly on a bridge over a canal, and partly at a redoubt, which protected the southern ford.

The second party of this divided column was commanded by Colonel Knox, who crossed the ford in a few minutes after the preceding party; but arriving to the island, turned to the left, in a contrary direction to the route of Captain Monson, and reached without much impediment, the pettah of Shahir Ganjam, which he found abandoned by the enemy. He was now near the great garden at the western point of the island. In vain he waited here to be joined by the other part of his column, which, as I observed, was in a different quarter. Hearing at length a firing at the ford near the great garden, which he rightly supposed might be that of the enemy,

disputing the passage of the Cavery with Colonel Maxwell's division, he instantly dispatched some troops to that quarter, who taking the Mysoreans in flank, quickly dispersed them, and thus secured an easy passage for the Colonel.

The third party of the same column under the command of Captain. Hunter, came to the Cavery not long after Col. Knox had reached the island, but missing the regular ford, crossed it immediately opposite the Rajah's garden, or Dowlet Bang, of which he took possession. As he did not suppose that any of the others had gained the island before him, he judged it best to wait in the situation he then occupied, until the remainder of the column should arrive, or until he could learn with certainty, where his assistance would be most necessary. He was, however, soon discovered by the enemy, who apprized of his small number, came with a considerable force. and even some cannon, to bear upon the garden. Finding therefore that his position would not be long tenable, particularly towards day-light, he recrossed the Cavery, under a heavy fire, and very fortunately at this critical period, joined Lord Cornwallis.

While success thus attended in various parts the front column of the centre division, the middle one commanded by Colonel Stuart, immediately after passing the bound-hedge, moved to the left, and routed the right wing of the

enemy. Colonel Stuart then advanced to Tippoo's redoubt, which he found abandoned. Still proceeding to the left, he crossed the Cavery, at the very ford which Colonel Maxwell had just passed, and arriving on the island, joined both Colonel Maxwell's and Colonel Knox's parties; taking as senior officer, the command of the whole. Captain Monson, likewise a little before daylight, quitted his position on the southern side of the island, and marched to the same post.

The rear column of the centre division, under the immediate command of Lord Cornwallis, took post at the Sultaun's redoubt, after Colonel Stuart had left it, waiting for hours with extreme anxiety, but in vain, for a junction with General Medows.

When Captain Hunter joined his Lordship, his troops had scarcely time to replace their cartridges, which had been damaged in their recrossing the Cavery, before a considerable body of the enemy rallied and began an attack with great fury. Though repeatedly driven back, they again advanced to the charge, and were not finally repulsed, till the day was nearly broken. His Lordship then quitted his post, and retreated towards the Pagoda Hill. In this attack a musquet-ball grazed his Lordship's left hand.

In the mean time, General Medows with the right division passed the bound-hedge, without opposition. The officer who was at the head of the front column, not finding any enemy

in his way, but perceiving on the right a strong redoubt, called the Eadgah, or Mosque redoubt, immediately wheeled his column towards it. The Mysoreans, having been apprized of their danger, by the firing which they had previously heard in other quarters, were prepared for their defence. Severe, and indeed for some time, doubtful was the conflict ; but the post was at length carried, by the persevering spirit of the column, who driving the enemy from the redoubt, forced them upon the bayonets of the main body of the division, which was by this time formed by General Medows, to support the assault. The general having secured this post, changed his route, and marched rapidly to the eastward to join Lord Cornwallis, as had been previously agreed ; but in hope of avoiding some swampy ground, he unluckily made a greater circuit than he intended, and crossing the track by which the centre division had advanced, without observing it, at length arrived to the Pagoda Hill, to his great surprize and vexation. He was joined here at day-break by his Lordship.

The left division, commanded by Colonel Maxwell, which was ordered to attack the redoubt on the Pagoda Hill, arrived there before the alarm became general in the Sultaun's camp. This strong and important fort was taken with a very trifling loss, and after a slight opposition. However, in descending the hill, in or-

der to proceed against the right of Tippoo's line, the troops were considerably galled by the enemy's fire ; but having formed at last on the plain, they soon succeeded in turning the Sultaun's flank, at the very moment that the centre division pressed him in front. The enemy now giving way, Colonel Maxwell proceeded to the ford, and gained the island, where, as before observed, he joined the other parties.

Tippoo, when day-light appeared, began to estimate his losses. Driven from his fortified camp and only sharing the island itself with his adversaries, he found himself reduced to a most alarming situation. He did not, however, let despondency overcome his spirits ; he did not waste his time with fruitless complaints, but immediately endeavoured to retrieve the misfortunes of the night with perseverance and fortitude.

His first attempt was against Colonel Stuart, who was in possession of the Laul Baug, at the western extremity of the island, but he found him too securely posted to be easily removed. Abandoning therefore the idea, he next dispatched a body of troops to retake the redoubt on the northern side of the Cavery, (called the Sultaun's redoubt) where only a party of about one hundred and fifty men had been left by the column, by Lord Cornwallis, on its retreat at night. The guns of the fort, which were within reach, opened upon it in the morning, and

soon cleared the gorge of the redoubt, which was much exposed towards the island. The Mysoreans then advanced to the assault, but were repulsed with considerable loss. The day grew extremely hot, and no water could be procured for those who were sinking under their wounds, and dying with thirst: fresh troops seemed to be advancing, and a second attack was much dreaded: for little hope was entertained of effectually opposing them, from a deficiency of cartridges, almost all of which had been expended in the preceding conquest. Two bullocks, at this critical moment, laden with ammunition, were observed in the ditch, whither they had accidentally wandered during the night. No sooner were these new means of resistance thus providentially procured, than another and more furious attack commenced, but to as little purpose as the former. The enemy approached a third time, with the hope of recovering, if possible, this important station; but they were driven back as before, and the victorious English still retained their position.

Tippoo, now mortified at the inefficacy of every attempt to regain what he had lost, withdrew all his forces from the northern side of the island, and prepared with unremitting fatigue for the defence of the fort, almost the only place of consequence he retained in his extensive empire. The

ground on which he had been lately encamped, the allied armies immediately after occupied.

The Sultaun, in this perilous situation, particularly as some of the most capable of the Frenchmen and other foreigners who had been long in his service now deserted and joined his adversaries, felt the necessity of negotiating, if possible, an immediate peace. While he yet retained a shadow of independence, something he thought might be expected from the policy as well as generosity of the English, who might only wish to reduce, not to annihilate the Mysorean empire. Impressed with this idea, he released the officers who had been made prisoners at Coimbetore, and sent them loaded with presents to the British camp, entreating them to use their interest with Lord Cornwallis, to open a negotiation for peace. Previous to their departure, Tippoo had written to Lord Cornwallis the following letter on the subject:

“ At this time, with a view to strengthen the friendship and remove the disagreements between the Ahmudy Sirkar, the Company, his Highness the Nawub Asoph Jaw, and the Peishwa; and to cultivate the ties of intimacy between those four Sirkars, a confidential and experienced man belonging to this Sirkar will be deputed to your lordship, in order that by negotiation personally with every one, the displeasure of the mind may be done away, and a reconciliation with each

other (which is for the good and quiet of mankind) may take place. If this meets with your lordship's approbation, be pleased to notify it, that the above-mentioned person may be sent to a place appointed, and the ancient friendship may be renewed."

To this his lordship returned the following answer:—"It is well known, that after having made every conciliatory proposition in my power to prevent this war, I was forced by the dictates of honor and good faith, to have recourse to arms, to save one of the Company's allies from destruction; and I have ever been desirous to make peace, as soon as proper compensation can be received, for the injuries and losses that have been sustained by the Company, and by those allies with whom it is connected in the strictest bonds of confederacy.—But with what confidence can a negotiation be carried on with a man, who not only violates treaties of peace, but also disregards the faith of capitulations, during war.—The garrison at Coimbatore ought by the capitulation to have been set at liberty, upon certain conditions, immediately after its surrender: and I have a just right to demand, that the agreement should still be executed on the spot where it was made; but being unwilling, at this critical time, to occasion any delay that can be avoided in opening a negotiation, I shall not insist on a literal performance of the original stipulations, on account of

the length of time that the execution would require—Let therefore the garrison of Coimbatore be sent to this army, to be set at liberty according to the conditions of the capitulation, that was settled between Lieutenant Chalmers and Cummer-ud Dien Cawn, and I shall then be ready, in concert with the allies, to fix upon a place where Vakeels from you may conveniently meet proper persons that will be deputed, on the part of the three confederated powers, for the purpose of endeavouring to arrange the terms on which a general peace can be re-established.”

Tippoo manifested much duplicity in this business; he denied that any capitulation for the garrison had takdn place between Lieutenant Chalmers and Cummer-ud Dien Cawn. Lord Cornwallis, not wishing to drive him to despair by treating so shameless an assertion as it deserved, and by that means shutting the door against all treaty, informed him that it depended entirely upon himself to state this matter in a clear and uncontrovertible light, by communicating again with Cummer-ud Dien upon the subject, and by a personal examination of Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, who were still in his possession; and that in case of any misinformation, he could without the least prejudice to his interest, as his lordship would engage that neither of the gentlemen should serve against him during the war, easily make the truth be known by sending out Lieu-

tenants Chalmers and Nash, or one of them, to explain the business. But Tippoo took no notice of this proposition, till now after the defeat of his army, when he sent letters by these Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, requesting again that Vakeels might be received from him to open a negociation for peace.

Tippoo's flagrant breach of the capitulation was clearly established by the personal testimony of Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, but as his lordship thought no time should be lost in securing a safe and honorable peace, he did not resent it, particularly as he learned from Lieutenant Chalmers that the garrison of Coimbatore was so much dispersed that it was not in Tippoo's power to execute the capitulation immediately : he saw therefore that perseverance in requiring a literal compliance with this demand would amount to a virtual refusal to enter into any negociation, and judged it adviseable to relax upon that point ; accordingly, after consulting with the allies, his lordship sent word to Tippoo, that as he had shown a disposition to make atonement for the breach of the capitulation, he would not on account of the present critical affairs, insist upon its being fully executed previous to all negociation, and therefore he was at liberty, according to his request to send Vakeels to a spot that was pointed out, where

deputies from the confederate powers would meet them to hear their propositions.

In consequence of this permission, Tippoo appointed Gullum Ali Cawn (who had been at the head of his embassy to Constantinople,) and Ali Reza, his Vakeels; and they arrived and encamped at the place that had been fixed upon for them, on the afternoon of the 13th of February.

Conceiving it to be very improbable that Tippoo would authorise his Vakeels to make any specific propositions, the deputies were prepared to state those to which the allies would agree. They met on the 14th. A demand was made by the deputies of the cession of the country to the extent of three crores of rupees of revenue, and of eight crores of rupees in ready money. The Vakeels protested the total inability of their master to comply with this demand, but said they would immediately inform him of it, and return as soon as possible with his answer.

While Tippoo was embracing this pacificatory measure, his active mind, ever fruitful in stratagems, projected another more expeditious mode of extricating himself from his difficulties, which was no less than making at once a bold attempt on Lord Cornwallis's life. The very day on which he released the officers, his cavalry were observed to quit their encampment on the southern side of the Caverry: but as it was conjectured that they were going to protect some dis-

tant convoy, there was very little notice taken of it. They contrived on the morning of the subsequent day, to get between the Nizam's and the British camp undiscovered. A party of them, who were mistaken for the Nizam's troops, immediately advanced towards the British lines, and enquiring for the tent of the commander, were directed to Colonel Duff's, whom, as being commanding officer of the artillery, it was supposed they wanted. Drawing instantly their swords, they pushed for the tent to which they were directed, cutting down a few who opposed them; but before they found time to execute their project, they turned about, and galloped off with great precipitation apprehensive that if they delayed to accomplish their design, they would probably be overpowered, and put to the sword.

General Abercromby now arrived with the Bombay army, who furnished a reinforcement of about 2000 Europeans, and 4000 native troops.

Notwithstanding the negotiation for peace was now opened, in consequence of Tippoo's overtures, Lord Cornwallis was still incessantly busy in making preparations for an attack on the fort, which after some deliberation he deemed most practicable on the northern side across the Cavery. As the erection of batteries in the day-time within gun shot of the fort, appeared to be an undertaking of much hazard and difficulty, he

resolved to erect them during the night, while he tried, by way of a diversion, to beat up the enemy's camp on the other side of the island. Accordingly a detachment was sent on the latter enterprise, which by a considerable detour, arrived at its place of destination undiscovered, when an immediate slaughter commenced. Before any effectual resistance was attempted, about 100 troopers and 200 horses were killed.

The consternation which this spirited attack occasioned engaged the Sultaun's attention on the southern side of the island, while batteries were constructing without molestation on the northern side, within 800 yards of the walls. The whole proceeding became manifest at the break of day : so that every gun which could be brought to bear was opened upon the new directed works, while parties of infantry crossed the river to harass the troops stationed in that quarter. Tippoo, now convinced of his inability to interrupt the progress of the siege, contrived to change the course of a canal which supplied the allies with water, and turn it into the Caverry, by which means he not only hoped to deprive his enemies of the advantages resulting from a stream constantly running through their camp, but at the same time to increase the hazard of an assault, by swelling the river to a greater height than usual. However the distress of

the allies was but of a short duration, for a detachment was immediately dispatched to investigate the cause of the sudden failure in the waters of the canal, which soon drove the Mysoreans from the ground they occupied on its banks, and reconveyed the stream to its accustomed channel.

Feb. 19. The siege commenced in earnest, and all the batteries opened on the fort, while General Abercromby crossed the Caverry, west of Seringapatam, and took post on some heights on the south-west side of the fort, out of gunshot. However he was not able to effect this alteration in this position without much resistance from the enemy who more than once attempted but in vain, to prevent him from executing his design. When posted to his wishes, he was ordered to possess himself of a redoubt, and a grove beyond it, which were situated between him and the fort. Towards night a small party were dispatched for this purpose, but the enemy perceiving their drift, they were vigorously attacked the subsequent morning. Being through want of ammunition compelled to retreat, they were pursued in a very tumultuous and disorderly manner; when instantly advancing again, they briskly charged and routed the Mysoreans. The enemy however with a strong reinforcement, appeared the second time, and the English forces, labouring under the same difficulty as before, were a second time

obliged to retreat; but fortunately meeting a battalion with a supply of cartridges, they returned, and victoriously retained the disputed ground, after an obstinate and tedious conflict.

At the principal point of attack on the northern side of the island, a second parallel had been completed, within 600 yards of the fort, and the spot was marked out for the breaching batteries within 500 yards, when orders were suddenly issued to desist from the operations of the siege, and at the same time the termination of hostilities announced.

From the 15th to the 21st of February there had been repeated meetings of the Vakeels and deputies; but till the 24th, when the siege became more and more alarming, and the moment seemed rapidly approaching, in which the capital itself was likely to be completely subdued by the allied forces, nothing decisive was adopted. Now the humbled Tippoo, being abandoned by his troops, numbers of whom were continually deserting to his adversaries, deprived of almost all supplies, cooped up in one corner of a small island, in a post which he could not flatter himself would be long tenable, but which he had nevertheless determined to preserve or perish; and perceiving his opponents at the same time flushed with repeated conquests, and in daily expectation of receiving a considerable accession of strength by the junction of Purseram Bhow, as well as

by reinforcements from the south, submitted at length to the following terms:

1. That he should cede one half of his dominions to the allied powers.

2 That he should pay three crores and thirty lacks of rupees.

3 That he should unequivocally restore all the prisoners which had been taken by the Mysoreans from the time of Hyder Ally.

4. That two of his three eldest sons should be delivered up as hostages for the due performance of the treaty.

In conformity to such hard but necessary terms, two of the Sultaun's sons were sent with great pomp to the English camp. It was said that the want of punctuality in the delivery of the hostages, was occasioned by some domestic difficulties in Tippoo's own family, as well as by its requiring some time to arrange their attendants and settle the ceremonials of their reception in camp. Though it cut Tippoo to the heart to part with his boys, yet warrior-like he took leave of them without a tear; but the mother hung upon their necks for some moments; she had not sufficient patriotic fortitude to hush her maternal feelings! the boys took leave of their parents with manly firmness, and seemed cheerful that they were in some measure the instruments of peace. They arrived at Lord Cornwallis's the 27th of February. About twelve o'clock the works of the fort of Se-

ringapatam were crouded with an innumerable multitude of people, among whom was Tippoo Sultaun. The young princes made their appearance in a few minutes afterwards, and were then conducted from the island to a large pavilion pitched for their reception, near Sibbault's redoubt, about a mile from the fort, where they were received by Sir John Kennaway, who attended them, accompanied by an escort, to headquarters. On entering the camp they were saluted with 19 guns, and the part of the line they passed was under arms.---The officers saluted--- Lord Cornwallis received them in his tent, which was guarded by a battalion of Sepoys, and they were then formally delivered to his lordship by Gullum Alli Beg, the Sultaun's Vakeel, as hostages for the true performance of the treaty. An awful silence for a moment prevailed. At length Gullum Alli, approaching Lord Cornwallis, with much agitation thus emphatically addressed his lordship :

‘ These children, (pointing to the young princes whom he then presented) were this morning the sons of my master, Tippoo Sultaun; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your lordship as their father.’

The tender and affectionate manner in which Lord Cornwallis received them, seemed to confirm the truth of the expression. He said, ‘ he knew what the feelings of a father were, and

that they should never want a father while under his care.' The attendants of the young princes seemed astonished, and their countenances were highly expressive of the satisfaction they felt in the benevolence of his lordship. Some conversation now took place between Lord Cornwallis and Tippoo's Vakeels, in which the latter declared that the termination of the war diffused happiness throughout all ranks of people. After sitting a few minutes, his lordship retired, accompanying the young princes to their tents, under an escort of British troops, which remained with them as their guard. Lord Cornwallis, before he took leave of them, presented each of them with a gold watch as a mark of his esteem.

The Indian princes were dressed in long white muslin gowns and red turbans. They had several rows of large pearls round their necks, from which was suspended an ornament consisting of a ruby and an emerald of considerable size, surrounded by large brilliants; and in their turbans each had a sprig of rich pearls. Bred up from their infancy with infinite care, and instructed in their manners to imitate the utmost reserve and politeness, all the spectators were astonished at the correctness and propriety of their behaviour.

Notwithstanding the ratification of the preliminary articles of peace, and the delivery of the young princes into the hands of Lord Cornwal-

lis, the definitive treaty proceeded but slowly : so much so, that at one time preparations were actually ordered for recommencing the siege. Tippoo however assented (March 19) to the arrangements that were proposed.

The definitive treaty consisted of eight articles.

Art. 1. That the articles of two former treaties, the first with Hyder Alley Cawn, August 8, 1770, and the other with Tippoo Sultaun, March 11, 1784, should remain still in full force.

Art. 2. That the two sons of Tippoo Sultaun shall be detained as hostages till the stipulated sum, to be paid at three instalments, not exceeding four months each, shall be discharged—On payment thereof, and the cession of one half the country, and release of the prisoners—the said two sons shall be immediately dismissed.

Art. 3. That according to the first article of the preliminary treaty, it is agreed that one half of the dominions which were in possession of Tippoo Sultaun at the commencement of the war, shall be ceded to the allies.

Here follows the general abstract of countries comprising half the dominions to be ceded to the allies, agreeable to their respective shares.

Art. 4. Relative to the cession and necessary exchanges of Nam Keel Sunkaghurry, Selem, Cavery Poor, Attoor, and Permutti.

Art. 5. Such treaties and forts as are to be ceded by Tippoo Sultaun shall be delivered up without any cavil or demand for outstanding balances : and such talooks and forts as are to be relinquished by the three powers to Tippoo Sultaun, shall in

the same manner be delivered up—orders to this effect shall be immediately prepared and delivered—on the receipt of which, the discharge of the money stipulated to be paid immediately, and prisoners on all sides be released, without detaining a single person.

Art. 6. Whatever guns and shot shall be left by Tippoo Sultaun in the forts ceded to the allied powers, an equal number of guns and shot shall be left in the forts which the allied powers have agreed to restore.

Art. 7. The contracting parties agree that zemindars and aumildars being in balance to either party, and repairing to the country of either party, protection shall not be given them, and they shall be restored. If any disputes arise on the boundaries of the allies, and the said Tippoo Sultaun, they shall be adjusted with the knowledge and approbation of all parties.

Art. 8. The Polygars and Zemindars, who in the course of the war have attached themselves and been serviceable to the allies, shall not on that account be in any manner molested by Tippoo Sultaun.

The hostage princes were treated with the utmost cordiality during their stay in the English camp; but the eldest son, Abdal Khalik, was certainly the favourite both of Lord Cornwallis and Lady Oakley; the former having proved his partiality by a very magnificent present he made to him on his return to the capital of Seringapatam, at the ratification of the treaty. His lordship, among several other costly things, then

presented this young prince with the most beautiful palanquin which the mechanics of India could produce, richly ornamented with solid silver and gold mouldings; the pannels on each side were decorated with emblematical devices, characteristic of the prejudices of the Mysoreans, supported by two snakes, whose colour in the sun was such a fine piece of Art, as to be a close representation of Nature. This prince, then in his fourteenth year, possessed many excellent qualities—he was mild, courteous, and generous—in short, for affability and sentiment, he was the contrast of his ancestors.

CHAP. X.

Tippoo's losses and mortification—Description of the Zenanna—Tippoo takes advantage of the war between England and France—Supplicates the latter for assistance against the English—His secret correspondence with the French Directory.

BANGALORE was acknowledged to have been the richest gem in the Mysorean crown; both nature and art combined to render it a beautiful place;

the houses were regular and magnificent, the gardens delightful and salubrious. The loss of such a place consequently gave Tippoo no small share of uneasiness. His boundless ambition, which was ever accompanied with pride, was now sadly mortified and disappointed: indeed his losses in this war were considerable. The number of captured forts, guns, and troops, were immense; upwards of 70 forts surrendered to the allies. Instead of increasing his power, with the hope of which he had been cajoled, he now beheld a woful decrease; while 800 pieces of cannon, which he lost, gave additional strength to the districts that had been conquered; and the destruction and dispersion of above 50,000 fighting men, reduced considerably his sway.

Tippoo's pride and ambition were by no means humbled by these losses. He still looked forward to the recovery of his power, and only waited the opportunity of avowing his hatred and jealousy of the English.

Tippoo now passed the chief part of his time in the Zenanna, where he had a great many beautiful women; those by whom he had sons were always his favourites: these ladies take their precedence accordingly, but lose it on the death of a child. Tippoo did not make his choice by throwing a handkerchief, as is said to be the custom at Constantinople, but communicated to his

chief minis^ter the preference he intended ; and this minister officially made known his master's choice to the lady.

There is great attention paid to the education of these females in respect to dancing, singing, and music. The Zenanna has boasted of one hundred ladies, though latterly the number did not exceed eighty.

These ladies change their dresses continually ; their whole time seems to be employed in adorning their persons, for the elegance of which, and accomplishment of manners they certainly rival all the other women of the place : their apartments and furniture are magnificent, and they have visits of ceremony with each other. Indeed the love of dress is universally prevailing : the meanest labourer will expend his earnings in satisfying the idle vanity of his children. The women are subject to severe punishment for infidelity or licentiousness, and endure much shame and contumely if they have no children.

The war between England and France suggested to Tippoo the hope of revenging himself on the former by the assistance of the latter. Accordingly he held a regular correspondence with the French government at the Mauritius, where he had ambassadors who solicited a levy of troops for renewing hostilities with the English. He importuned them constantly for succour, and deluded by their artful promises, absolutely parad-

ed about with his army in Mysore, which conduct was at length noticed by the Governor General, Lord Mornington, who succeeded Lord Cornwallis.

This secret correspondence with the French Directory was continued for some time. The following are copies of the most particular letters (which were afterwards discovered) that passed on the occasion.

No. 1.—Copy of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Executive Directory.

In the name of the friendship which the Sirkar Condadad and his nation vow to observe towards the French Republic, a friendship and alliance which will endure as long as the Sun and Moon shall continue to shine in the Heavens, and will be so solid that the most extraordinary circumstances shall never break or disunite either the one or the other.

The English, jealous of the connection and friendship which for a long time reigned between my Sirkar and France, have united themselves to the Mahrattas, to the Nizam Ali Khan, and to my other enemies, for the purpose of declaring war against me; a war as odious and unjust as that which had lasted for some years before, and which was attended with such fatal consequences to me, by taking from me my finest provinces, three crores, and thirty lacks of rupees.

The Republic is not ignorant of any of these unfortunate circumstances; and of my having endeavoured to dispute every inch of territory, which I was forced to give up to our common enemy. I should not have been compelled to make those cruel sacrifices had

I been assisted by the French, my ancient allies; who deceived by the perfidious projects of Governor-General Conway at Pondicherry, together with Governor Campbell at Madras, agreed to the evacuation, of the place which they commanded. The French Republic, by expelling the English from their rich possessions in India, will certainly repair the faults of their ancient Government.

Animated for a long time by these sentiments, I have communicated them to the Government of the Isle of France through the medium of two Ambassadors, from whom I have just had the high satisfaction of receiving such answers as I wished for; as well as the Republican colours from the Chief of Brigade Chapins, and the Naval Captain Du Buc, who have brought to me such succours in soldiers and officers as circumstances have permitted General Malartic and Rear-Admiral Sercey to send me.

I keep near me the former Officer, and send you the second in quality of an Ambassador for the purpose, at the same time that he demands your alliance offensive and defensive, of obtaining forces sufficient to attack and annihilate our common enemies. I will transmit to you by his means my standard, which, united to that of the Republic, will serve as a basis of the alliance which the two nations are about to contract. I have also charged him to communicate particular orders to you.

I join with him in the embassy Sheik Abdoubrain and Mahomet Bismilla, my subjects, who are equally directed to represent me in all affairs which they have to transact with you.

Whatever may be the circumstances in which the two nations may hereafter find themselves, whether

together or separately in all their transactions, may the good, the glory, and the advantage of both, be always the end of them ! May their respective sentiments be guaranteed by the appearances of fidelity and the solemn pledges given by each of them ! and may the heavens and earth draw near to each other and unite, sooner than our alliance shall experience the slightest alteration !

Given at my Palace at Seringapatam, July 20, 1798.

*No. 2.—Copy of Articles of Engagement proposed by
Tippoo Sultaun to the Directory.*

RECAPITULATION of the Demands which my Ambassadors are to make of the Executive Directory at Paris :---

Art. 1. Ten or fifteen thousand troops, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

2. A naval force to carry on hostilities on the coast where our armies may be, in order to favour their operations, or reinforce them, if necessary.

3. The Sirkar shall furnish all warlike stores and provisions to the armies of the Republic, as well as horses, oxen, and every necessary article, with the exception of European liquors, which he has not in his country.

4. The orders of the King shall be taken with respect to all the marches and military operations.

5. The expedition shall be directed against some point of the coast of Coromandel, and in preference against Porto Novo, where the disembarkation of the troops shall take place, and the King shall first repair thither with his army, his intention being to commence his operations in the heart of the enemy's country.

6. The King demands that notice shall be given to him by the Republic in dispatching two corvettes from Europe, at a distance of twenty days from each other, of the number of ships and troops to be sent to him, that he may immediately enter upon the campaign, and make himself master of the coast of Coromandel before the arrival of the Republican forces.

7. All the conquests made from the enemy shall, with the exception of the Provinces which the King has been obliged to cede to the English, to the Maharrattas, and to Nizam Ali Khan, be equally divided between the two nations, and according to the respective Conventions, the same division shall take place of the enemy's vessels and the Portuguese Colonies, for the purpose of indemnifying the King for the expences of the war.

8. If any difficulty shall arise between the Allied Armies, each of them shall possess the right of referring to their modes of justice according to their laws and customs, and every discretionary article shall be agreed upon in writing between both nations.

9. That whatever may be the wish of the Republic to make peace with England, or to continue the war, it shall always consider the King as its friend and faithful ally, and include him in all its treaties, and communicate to him all its intentions.

10. All French who now are in, or may come into the States of the King, shall be treated as friends and allies, and they shall be empowered to come and go, and carry on trade without being liable to any trouble or molestation, but shall on the contrary receive every assistance of which they may stand in need.

11. This article relates to bringing into the service of the Sultaun, several French artists and mechanics,

skilled in casting cannon, in paper and glass making, with some engineers and builders.

Given in my Palace of Seringapatam, under my signature, that of my Prime Minister, and authenticated with the State Seal, on the 20th of July. 1798.

No. 3.—*Copy of a Letter from Dubuc to the Rajah of Travencore's Minister.*

MY LORD,

I EXPECT with impatience the arrival of some vessels from India, to hear from you, and to learn that your health is perfectly re-established, if, as it has been reported here, it has been in a bad state.

As the means of sending intelligence to India are very fluctuating, I take the opportunity of a vessel which is sailing for the coast of Coromandel, to write to the Prince Tippoo Sultaun, with whom I have the honour to correspond. I request he will be pleased to communicate my letter to you, after having caused it to be translated into the Oriental language, that it may not be necessary for you to shew it to any one.

I have often considered in my own mind, why your Prince was not in alliance with the Sultaun, and in recollecting that the great Nabob Hyder Ally, his father, had been the friend and ally of Ram Rajah, I was astonished that that friendship, which had been deranged by some event, had not been renewed. It is very common in Europe for a power which has been at war with its neighbour to become its friend and ally. You have been at war with the Bacha. I feel the sincerest conviction that every resentment should be forgotten, that all former disputes should be con-

signed to oblivion, and that it is the duty of the two Princes to enter into a treaty of alliance and friendship, in a way solid and suitable to their reciprocal interests. Were I, in India, I should give you as well as the Sultaun, such substantial grounds for that proceeding, that I am confident my wishes would be fulfilled ; but it will be peculiarly your glory to unite these two powers. You are the counsellor and the friend of your King ; you direct his affairs so advantageously that if you find this alliance profitable (and I do not doubt but you will) it will be sufficient for you to propose it to him, and the two Princes will readily come to a good understanding.—Should my hopes be gratified in this respect, my joy will be complete, for you will be considered our ally in becoming that of a Prince who has been for a long time united with France. I pray Heaven to grant you long and happy days, and that those of your King may be prosperous, is the sincere wish of your servant and friend,

MAL. DESCOMBRE.

Isle de France, Mar. 5, 1798.

No. 4.—*Copy of a Letter from Dubuc to Tippoo Sultaun ; dated 10th December, 1798, O. S.*

GRAND PACHA,

HEALTH and respect ! The men have fortunately arrived, but we are in want of the most essential thing—the *letters* which they left on their way. I however hope they will arrive in a few days. They have been four months on their journey, and you may judge of their dispatch and of their punctuality in their services to you. The Alcarahs whom I dispatched to you on the 11th of last month, returned yester-

day with your Majesty's answer of the 29th of the same month, and I hasten to send them back, as they are very faithful persons, and I wish them to be liberally rewarded. The person who was to have furnished the money has not made his appearance, and I fear there will be considerable difficulty in getting them paid. I think it indispensably necessary for you to expedite an order for taking up immediately all the money which is at *Mercieu's*, and to annex it to a letter of credit, as I had requested of you, on the Republic. The importance of my mission is such, and the result of it must prove so advantageous to your Majesty, that I cannot too often repeat, money must be considered as nothing, when affairs of such immense moment are carrying on. It will be necessary for me to depart, and without money I cannot. In all countries money is the sinew of war, and if your Majesty does not wish to be ruined by the English, and lose the assistance of your good friends the French, give me a sufficient demonstration of your confidence in giving me the proper means of proceeding. Socars with money will not be stopped, more particularly if it be in pagados, with stars. Use dispatch in sending it to me, and I shall instantly set off. The clothes are not yet come, and I have dispatched people to forward them. I request your Majesty will authorise me to take a year's salary in advance, as you promised me, in order to provide for the subsistence of my family in my absence, since the six months for which I have been paid expire on the 8th of next month, and that I have been compelled to expend every thing in my possession. The English having taken my ship and my property, you will consider my demand just in every point of view, when you re-

fect that my family are in a foreign country, deprived of every resource. I once more repeat my earnest desire that your Majesty will give me full powers in that respect, and order me immediately to be provided with the necessary funds. The Alcarahs have promised to return within 30 days, and I shall be able to depart in 40. It would be prudent to have some other Alcarahs here, that you may receive intelligence every eight days. I beg leave to recommend earnestly to you the Ouaquil, who is not sufficiently paid, and has received nothing for eight months past. He also should have a palanquin; for the envoy of a great Prince, so truly noble and generous as you are, ought not to walk on foot like a Cooly. Are you content with my conduct? Speak candidly. You know how much I am attached to you, and you, shall have certain proofs of my fidelity. I beseech your Majesty to countenance your bounty and protection to my good friend and colleague General Chapins. See him often, and the more you shall see him the more you shall know that he is worthy of your esteem, as a man of honour and prudence.

I have learned that your Majesty has written to the government of Madras and to Lord Mornington. What will be the issue of their answer? Be on your guard against them; be ready either to defend yourself, or to make an attack. The preparations for war are going on with great rapidity. The army of the Nizam is already on its march; it must be stopped. The English were desirous of carrying away Ouaquil Sacha Chidevaran; but I discovered the plot, and it has not succeeded. It is necessary that your Majesty should instantly write to the Government of Tranquebar, by a swift courier, to

demand its immediate protection for your General in Chief Du Buc, his Major Filietag, the Interpreter De Bay, and your Ouaquil. Lord Mornington, Governor General of Bengal, and General Clarke, are coming to the coast about the end of this month, for the purpose of entering into negotiations with your Majesty, which if they are not advantageous to them, they will cause you to declare war against them. The result of that measure will be the invasion of your country, and the dethroning of you, by substituting for you and your heirs a Nabob of their own making. Your Majesty must perceive, that nothing less is in agitation than the destruction of your kingdom. You must exert yourself and negotiate every where for to maintain your power, until the moment when I shall be able to secure it for ever for yourself and your august children. It is very easy for the English, in consequence of their intrigues in every part of India, to cause troubles of a serious kind, and deprive you of all your Allies. Should they succeed in the war against your Majesty, they would afterwards effect the destruction of the power of the Mahrattas, and deprive them of every possession which might be ceded to them by a new treaty of peace. It is therefore evidently their interest to treat jointly with you for the purpose of finding a certain and mutual guarantee, and that each member may defend the stipulations and cessions made by each at the peace which you signed in your capital with the contracting parties. The English threaten you, the Mahrattas are bound to support you, and not suffer you to be overcome. The barrier which separates you from the former should exist without any encroachment. You may rely on your allies as long as you possess interests in common, and you would be aban-

done by them were these common interests to cease.

The time is short and precious. You must give proofs of your good intentions, and gain over the English, and at the same time throw obstacles in the way of their negotiations at Poona. In such a conjecture, the Mahrattas ought to give to the law of treaties all possible weight, and not to omit recalling to the minds of the English the assistance granted by them against your Majesty. Should their remonstrances be neglected, and the means of conciliation prove fruitless, let them instantly take up arms, and threaten the nation guilty of a breach of the treaties. Such a proceeding would perhaps stop all military designs and operations against your Majesty. But if the event should prove different, the sword must be drawn, and the sheath thrown so far as to render every search for it useless. We have no intelligence of any peculiar interest from Europe. The Republic is uniformly victorious, and continues to refuse peace to England. Scindia has already taken Delhi, and I think that he must have also finished the conquest of Agra. It would be prudent in your Majesty to dispatch Couriers to him to acquaint him with the situation in which you are placed. I entreat your Majesty to read my letter attentively. It has been dictated by candour, truth, and a sense of your interest.

I pray God to grant success to the exertions of your Majesty, to whom I have the honour to be, with respect.

(Signed) DUBUC,

Commander in Chief, Naval Captain of the
French Republic, one and indivisible.

CHAP. XI.

Letters from Lord Mornington, General Harris, &c. to the Honourable Court of Directors, relative to Tippoo's clandestine proceedings; with a Copy of the Governor General's Declaration.

ON the discovery of this secret correspondence, the following letters from Lord Mornington, &c. addressed to the Honourable Court of Directors, will give the reader a perfect idea of Tippoo's clandestine proceedings.

Extract of a Letter from the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, to the Court of Directors, dated the 20th of March, 1799.

(Received per Sarah Christiana, 13th Sept. 1799)

TO THE HON. THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONORABLE SIRS,

IN my separate Dispatch of the 21st of Nov. by the Eurydice, I informed your Honourable Court, that although I had deemed it my duty

to call your armies into the field in every part of your possessions, my views and expectations were all directed to the preservation of peace in India. In the letter of the 13th of January, from the Governor-General in Council at Fort St. George, I apprized your Hon. Court of my arrival at this Presidency, to which I thought it my duty to proceed from Bengal, in the hope of opening a negociation with Tippoo Sultaun, for the amicable adjustment of the differences which had arisen between that Prince and the Hon. Company's Government. In my Dispatch to the Secret Committee of your Hon. Court, I have regularly transmitted advices of the state of political affairs in India, and I have fully explained the principles which have governed my conduct, not only towards Tippoo Sultaun, but towards all the native powers, since I have taken charge of the Government General.

Having ultimately been compelled to commence hostilities against Tippoo Sultaun, it is now become my duty to lay before your Hon. Court an accurate detail of the causes of the war in which we are engaged. For this purpose, it will be necessary to draw your attention to a period of time as remote as the month of June, 1798, and to trace from that date the progress of those events, which have finally produced the necessity of resorting to arms for the security of your interest committed to my charge.

A Proclamation issued by the Governor General of the Isle of France, in the month of February 1798, made its first appearance at Calcutta on the 8th of June of the same year. This Proclamation states, that an Embassy had arrived at the Isle of France with letters from Tippoo Sultaun, addressed not only to the Government of that Island, but to the Executive Directory of France; proposing to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, to subsidize and to supply whatever troops the French might furnish to the Sultaun, and to commence against the British Power in India a war of aggression, for which the Sultaun is declared to be fully prepared, waiting with anxiety the moment when the succour of France shall enable him to satisfy his ardent desire of expelling the British Nation from India. The Proclamation concludes by offering encouragement to the subjects of France to enter into the service of Tippoo Sultaun, on terms to be fixed with his Ambassadors then on the spot.

Although I was inclined, in the first instance, to doubt the authenticity of this extraordinary publication, I thought it advisable to transmit a copy of it on the 9th of June, to Lieutenant General Harris (then Governor of Fort St. George, and Commander in Chief on the coast of Coromandel) informing him that if the Proclamation should prove authentic, it must lead to a serious

discussion with Tippoo Sultaun; and directing Lieutenant General Harris to consider without delay the means of assembling the army on the coast of Coromandel, if necessity should unfortunately require such a precaution.

On the 18th of June, 1798, I received a regular authentication of the Proclamation, in a letter from his Excellency the Earl of Macartney, dated the 28th of March; and at the same time several persons arrived at Calcutta who had been present in the Isle of France at the time of the publication of the Proclamation.

Tippoo Sultaun dispatched two Ambassadors, who embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France, and arrived at Port Nord-ouest in that island, towards the close of the month of Jan. 1798, and the Proclamation in question originated in the arrival of Tippoo's Ambassadors at the Isle of France; it was distributed by their agents, it was avowed in every part by their own public declarations, and finally it was executed, according to its tenor, by their personal assistance and co-operation.

On the 7th of March, 1798, the Ambassadors embarked at Port Nord-ouest, on board the French frigate *La Preneuse*, together with the force thus raised in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, amounting to about 2000 men, inclusive of several officers, the chiefs of whom were M. M. Dubuc and Chapins. The French frigate *La Pre-*

neuse, with the Sultaun's Ambassadors, and the French troops levied for his service, arrived at Mangalore on the 26th of April. 1798.

An opportunity now occurred of ascertaining, beyond the possibility of doubt, whether the acts of the Sultaun's Ambassadors in the Isle of France were conformable to the instructions of their Sovereign. For although the presumption was already sufficiently powerful, it yet remained a question, whether Tippoo Sultaun would venture openly to avow proceedings which could not fail to expose him to the just resentment of your Government. This question was immediately solved, for the Sultaun, without hesitation, permitted the French force to land publicly at Mangalore, and, far from manifesting the least symptom of disapprobation of the conduct of the Embassy in any part of the negotiation. he formally received his Ambassadors, and the French officers, and principal persons in their suite, with public and extraordinary marks of honor and distinction ; and finally, he admitted the greater part of the French force raised for the purpose of making war upon the Hon. Company, into his service, in which it is still entertained. By this public and unequivocal sanction, he must be considered not only to have personally ratified the engagements contained in the Proclamations of the Governor General of the Isle of France, but to have taken

the preliminary measures for accomplishing the design which the Ambassadors had avowed in his name.

Tippoo Sultaun, therefore, having actually concluded offensive and defensive engagements with the French against the Hon. Company ; having collected, by the aid of the French, a force openly destined to carry those engagements into effect ; having applied to the Executive Directory of France for a more powerful force destined to the same end ; having signified through his Public Ambassadors to the Enemy, that his preparations for war (as far as they depended upon himself) were actually complete ; having avowed the object of those preparations to be the subversion of the British Empire in India ; and finally, having declared the delay of the meditated blow to proceed from no other cause, than his expectation of receiving further aid from the enemy ; I could not hesitate to pronounce, that he had flagrantly violated the Treaties of Peace subsisting between him and the Hon. Company ; and that he had committed an act of direct hostility and aggression against the British Government in India. To confirm the conclusions necessarily resulting from the facts already stated, I received undoubted information, that Tippoo Sultaun had for some time past been employed in military preparations, conformably to the hostile spirit of his engagements with the

enemy; that the greater part of his army was actually in a state of equipment for the field; and that a large portion of it was then encamped under his personal command.

To your Hon. Court it would be superfluous to observe, that no provocation had been offered by any of your Governments in India, to justify or to palliate any act of hostility, or even any emotion of jealousy or suspicion, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun; but I think it necessary to remark in this place, that at the very moment of receiving the authentic Copy of the Proclamation issued in the Isle of France, I had ordered the disputed District of Wynaad to be delivered to the Sultaun, after a public acknowledgment of the justice of his claim to that possession, and I had proposed to open an amicable negotiation for the purpose of adjusting his recent claims to a part of the district of Cooya, on similar principles of equity, according to the tenor of the 7th Article of the Treaty of Seringapatam.

The Sultaun himself had not attempted to allege even the pretext of a grievance against the British Government: In his letters to Sir John Shore, Tippoo declares, "That his friendly heart is disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord between the two Nations;" and he signifies his desire, that "Sir John Shore would impress Lord Mornington with a sense of

the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between the two States."

This is not the language of hostility, nor even of discontent; it is now proved, that these letters were written at the very crisis when he was in anxious expectation of the hourly arrival of that military succour which he had earnestly solicited from the enemy, for the express purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company's possessions.

Under all these circumstances an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of frustrating the execution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, appeared to me to be demanded by the soundest maxims both of justice and policy.

The act of Tippoo Sultaun's Ambassadors, ratified by himself, and followed by the admission of a French force into his army, was equivalent to a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war. But while his hostile purpose had been clearly manifested, the immediate means of accomplishing it had happily disappointed the ardour of his hopes. The inconsiderable amount of the aid which he had already received from the French, while it could not be construed as a limitation of my just right to vindicate the public safety, afforded strong argument of policy in favour of attacking this desperate, implacable, and treacherous enemy, before

he could either **complete** the improvement of his own army, under the French officers whom he had already admitted into his service, or could receive a further accession of strength under the progressive operation of his alliance with France.

- In the moment of his comparative weakness, of his disappointment, and probable dejection, the principles of justifiable self-defence, and of prudential precaution, required that we should strike such an instantaneous blow against his power and resources, as should preclude the possibility of his deriving any substantial advantage from the aid of France, whenever it might reach his dominions.

Such was the **tenor** of my opinions as early as the 20th of June, 1798. Although at that early period I could not ascertain from what quarter the French would attempt to assist the Sultaun, I recorded my conviction that some attempt to assist him would be among the earliest of their operations. The conclusion of Peace upon the Continent of Europe, the weak state of our Allies in India (particularly of the Nizam, whose Councils and Army where at that period subjected to the overbearing influence of a powerful French faction) might appeared both to Tippoo and to France to offer a favorable crisis for the attack of the British **possessions** in India. The disposition of the French government to attempt such an enterprise has never been disguised, and

although I had not obtained positive proof that any formal and regular correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and the Executive Directory of France had existed previous to the Embassy, and letters which arrived at the Mauritius, in January, 1798, yet the nature of that transaction afforded a strong presumption that a previous intercourse of the same hostile character had taken place.

I was apprized that Tippoo had also dispatched an embassy to Zemaun Shah, the object of which could be no other than to encourage that Prince in the prosecution of his long threatened invasion of Hindostan. The whole tenor of my advices from the North Western Countries of Hindostan, led me to believe that Zemaun Shah would cross the Attock, and would endeavour to pursue his avowed project of invasion in the course of the ensuing season; and it appeared probable that his approach, which must necessarily engage the attention of the army in Bengal, might be the signal to Tippoo Sultaun for an irruption into the Carnatic.

In addition to these considerations, it appeared by no means improbable, that the impetuosity of Tippoo Sultaun's temper, exasperated by the assiduous and unremitting instigations of the Emissaries of France, might break forth into hostilities without waiting for the actual movement of any Indian or European Ally. His late Embassy to the Isle of France, sufficiently mani-

fested a disposition capable of pursuing its favourite object of vengeance against the British nation with more zeal than discretion. It is my duty further to remark, that in the month of June, 1798, the distribution and condition of the army on the coast of Coromandel, to which I shall advert more fully in a subsequent part of this dispatch, offered but too strong a temptation to the enterprize of a faithless and active enemy. Under such circumstances it would have been an unmanly and weak policy to have confided the safety of the Carnatic to the precarious forbearance of Tippoo Sultaun, or to have left him any longer in the undisturbed possession of the powerful advantage of being able to chuse, according to his convenience, the time and mode of the attack which he had openly menaced. It therefore recorded my decided judgment, that it was necessary to assemble the armies on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar without delay, and I issued my final orders for this purpose on the 20th June, 1798.

To assemble the army on both coasts was an indispensable precaution, which I could not have been justified in omitting, from the moment that I was apprized of Tippoo Sultaun's offensive engagement with the French, and of the landing of a French force at Mangalore. But, being resolved on all occasions to submit to your Court a full and distinct view of the whole

scope of my motives and intentions, I have no hesitation in declaring, that my original resolution was (if circumstances would have admitted) to have attacked the Sultaun instantly, and on both sides of his dominions, for the purpose of defeating his hostile preparations, and of anticipating their declared object ; I was concerned however to learn, from persons most conversant in military details at Fort St. George (notwithstanding the distinguished discipline of your army on the coast of Coromandel, and the eminent valour, activity, and skill of its officers) its dispersed state, and certain radical defects in its establishment, would render the assembling a force equal to offensive movements against Tippoo, a much more tedious and difficult operation than I had apprehended:

Some officers of approved military talents, experience, and integrity, at Fort St. George, declared that your army in the Carnatic could not be assembled for offensive purposes before the commencement of the year 1800, and that a period of six months would be required for its equipment, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic against any sudden attack. The difficulty of assembling and moving your army on the coast of Coromandel, furnished indeed an alarming proof of the defenceless and perilous state of the Carnatic in that arduous conjuncture. But in proportion to the pressure of that difficulty, the

necessity of an instantaneous and active exertion became more urgent; for whether the army, when assembled, was to anticipate or wait the attack of Tippoo, it appeared an equally indispensable measure of precaution to resume, without delay, the power of meeting that vindictive and restless Prince in the field. I was not therefore discouraged, either by the suggestions to which I have referred, or by subsequent representations of a similar character and tendency, from insisting on the immediate execution of my orders for assembling the army; and advertng to the fatal consequences which have formerly been experienced in the Carnatic, by neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of hostile equipments in Mysore, I resolved to entrust the protection of your possessions on the coast of Coromandel to no other security than a complete and early state of preparation for war.

At Bombay, my orders for assembling the army were executed with great promptitude and alacrity, unaccompanied by any symptoms of indisposition to those united and zealous efforts, which the exigency of the crisis demanded from every branch of your civil and military service.

The unavoidable delay which obstructed the assembling your army in the Carnatic, having compelled me to relinquish my first intention of striking an immediate blow against the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaun, I applied my-

self to the formation of such a permanent system of preparation and defence, as, while it tended to restore the Government of Fort St. George, with all practicable dispatch, the power of repelling any act of aggression on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, might ultimately enable me to demand both a just indemnification for the expence which the Sultaun's violation of treaty had occasioned to your Government, and a seasonable security against the consequences of his recent alliance with the enemy. With this view, while the army was assembling on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, my early attention was directed to strengthen and improve the defensive alliance concluded between the Honourable Company, and their Highnesses the Nizam and Peshwah, under the treaties of Paangul, Poonah, and Seringapatam, for the purpose of establishing a barrier against the ambition and revenge of Tippoo Sultaun. The state of this alliance afforded abundant matter of painful anxiety; I found both the Peshwah and the Nizam (whose respective power it was the object of the treaty of Seringapatam to maintain in such a state of efficiency as might render them useful Allies in the event of a war with Mysore) reduced to the lowest condition of depression and weakness; the former by the intrusion of Doulet Row Scindia, and the latter by the threatened hostilities of the same chieftain, by the establishment of a numerous

and active French faction in the centre of the Decan; and while the internal convulsions of each state had diminished the resources of both, their co-operation against Tippoo Sultaun had become impracticable by the progress of their mutual animosities and dissensions.

In this scene of general confusion, the power of Tippoo Sultaun alone (which it had been the policy of our alliances and treaties to reduce) had remained undisturbed and unimpaired, if it had not been augmented and improved. The final result to the British Government appeared to me to be, first, the entire loss of the benefit of the treaty of triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, by the utter inability of our Allies to fulfil their defensive engagements with the Company; and, secondly, the establishment of a French army of 14,000 men, in the dominions of one of our Allies, in the vicinity of the territories of our irreconcilable enemy, and on the confines of the Carnatic and of the Northern Sirkars. In this state of our political relations, the Company was exposed, without the aid of a single Ally, to the hazard of a contest with the united force of Tippoo Sultaun and of the French. My separate dispatch under date the 21st of November, forwarded by the *Eurydice*, will have apprised your Honourable Court of the measures which I took for the purpose of restoring to his Highness the Nizam, the power of fulfilling his defensive en-

gements with the Company. At the same time my endeavours were employcd, with equal assiduity, to give vigour and effect to the treaties subsisting with his Highness the Peishwah. The return of Nana Furnaveess to the Administration, afforded, for some time, a just expectation that our alliance with the Mahrattas would speedily be restored with additional vigour and advantage; but the increasing distractions of the Mahratta Empire, unfortunately frustrated the wise counsels of that experienced and able Statesman, and disappointed my views at the Court of Poonah; I had however the satisfaction to ascertain, that the disposition of that Court, under the Administration of Nana, continued perfectly favourable to the British interests; and that want of power would be the sole cause of its inaction, in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

Towards the commencement of the month of August 1798, I learnt the preparations making by the French in the Mediterranean. Various circumstances attending the equipment of that armament, inclined me to apprehend, that at least a part of it might be destined for an expedition to India, although I could not believe that the attempt would be made through Egypt. Under these impressions, I took the earliest opportunity of directing the attention of Rear-Admiral Rainier to the Coast of Malabar, and at the same time I proposed to strengthen his Majes-

ty's squadron in these seas, according to any arrangement which his Excellency might suggest.

On the 18th of September I ratified the new subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, of which I have stated the substance in my separate dispatch of the 21st of November by the *Eurydice*. On the 18th of October, I received the first authentic information of the invasion of Egypt by the French, and of the progress of their arms in that country. It is unnecessary to call the attention of your Honourable Court to the evident connection of the invasion of Egypt with the joint designs of the French and of Tippoo Sultaun, against the British power in India.---The necessity of either compelling Tippoo Sultaun to detach himself from the interests of France, or of depriving him of the power of co-operating with the French if they should be enabled to reach India, now became too evident to admit of any doubt. My opinion had long been decided, that no negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun could be successful, unless accompanied by such a disposition of our force as should alarm him for the safety of his capital, and that no military operations could effect an adequate or speedy reduction of his power, unless directed immediately to the siege of that city. On the 20th of October, therefore, I gave peremptory orders to the Government of Fort St. George, for completing the equipment of their battering train, and for advancing it with all prac-

ticable dispatch to the most eligible station on the frontier of the Carnatic, with a view of proceeding towards Seringapatam at the earliest possible period, if such a movement into Mysore should become necessary. At the same time, I signified to the Government of Fort St. George, my intention of reinforcing their army with 3000 volunteers from the Native Infantry on the Establishment of Bengal, who had offered their services with the utmost alacrity and zeal.--- To the Government of Bombay I issued further orders, for the collection not only of their troops, but of the largest possible supplies on the Coast of Malabar.

On the 22d of October (as I have already informed your Honourable Court) the dismissal of the French faction in the Nizam's army was happily accomplished at Hydrabad. On the 31st of October, I received the intelligence of the glorious victory obtained by his Majesty's squadron under the command of Sir Horatio Nelson; but being still uncertain of the fate of the French army in Egypt, and ignorant whether an additional force might not have been intended to co-operate with it in India, by the ordinary passage round the Cape of Good Hope, I did not relax any part of the naval or military preparations which had been commenced under my orders. The opportunity now appeared favourable for opening a negociation with Tippoo Sultaun---I had already

communicated to the Allies, the Nizam and Peshwah, a circumstantial detail of the conduct of that Prince, and had received from both the most unequivocal assurances of their entire concurrence in my sentiments and views, as well as of their determination to support my just claims of satisfaction for the infraction of the treaty of Seringapatam.

On the 8th of November, therefore, I addressed to Tippoo Sultaun the letter, of which a copy accompanies this dispatch.

My expectation was, that the necessary impression of the success of his Majesty's fleet against the French in Egypt, the revival of our defensive alliance with the Nizam, the destruction of the French influence in the Decan, the declared disposition of the Peshwah to fulfil his defensive engagements to the utmost extent of his power, the presence of his Majesty's squadron on the coast of Malabar, reinforced by such of the Hon. Company's ships as had been equipped for the purpose, and, finally, the progress of our military preparations on both coasts, might have induced the Sultaun to accede to my proposals for opening the channels of pacific negotiation; and under these circumstances I trusted that the terror of the British arms might have rendered their actual employment unnecessary. With such expectations I resolved to proceed to Fort St. George, for the purpose of conducting

the expected negociation with the Sultaun, which I flattered myself my presence on the coast of Coromandel might enable me to bring to an issue, before the season should be so far advanced as to relieve Tippoo Sultaun from those alarms for the safety of his capital, on which I founded my sole hope of obtaining any satisfactory adjustment with him. On the 10th of December, I addressed a letter to the Sultaun, informing him of my intention to proceed to Fort St. George, and again urging him to receive Major Doveton. On the 25th of December I embarked on board his Majesty's ship the Sybille, Captain E. Cooke, and arrived at this Presidency on the 31st of the same month. A few days previous to my arrival, the Corps of Native Volunteers from Bengal had landed in perfect safety, and in the highest spirits, and soon after a corps of artillery arrived from Fort William under the command of Colonel Montague.

The letter marked No. 4, was delivered me on my arrival at Fort St. George. In this letter your Honourable Court will observe the prevarication and falsehood which mark the Sultaun's statesmen, of his intercourse with the French, and you will perceive the evasion by which he eludes the moderate and amicable proposition of the Allies for opening a negociation. To this letter from the Sultaun, I returned the answer, dated 9th of January, in which I renewed

the proposition of opening a negociation, and urged the Sultaun not to delay his reply beyond the period of one day after my letter should reach him, intimating that dangerous consequences might result from a longer delay. The advanced period of the season absolutely required that I should ascertain the Sultaun's views within a short time; my proposition contained nothing derogatory, to the honour or dignity of the Sultaun. I now employed every effort to advance the Military preparations in the Carnatic, which had already made a considerable progress during the months of November and December. From the moment of my arrival at Fort St. George, all the inhabitants of this settlement, and every officer, civil and military, appeared to be animated by an unanimous determination to discharge their respective duties with a degree of cheerfulness and ardour, correspondent to the exigency and importance of the occasion; and I was soon satisfied that the disposition, of which I lamented the appearance in the months of July and August, had either been subdued by the just exercise of authority, or corrected by reflection; and by the more full disclosure of the views of the enemy. The zeal, alacrity and public spirit of the Bankers and commercial Agents at Madras, as well as of the most respectable of your Civil Servants at this Presidency, enabled me within a few weeks, to raise a large sum of mo-

ney, by loan, for the public service. Previous to my departure from Bengal, I had remitted twenty lacks of rupees in specie for the use of this Presidency; I now dispatched the Sybille to Calcutta for a further supply and the extraordinary exertion of his Excellency the Vice-President in Council, assisted by the diligence and ability of Mr. Thomas Myers, the Accomptant General of Bengal, furnished me with an additional aid of twenty lacks, within so short a time, that the movement of the army was not delayed for an instant, on account of a deficiency of treasure, and Lieut. General Harris was provided with a sufficient supply of specie to maintain his army in the field until the month of May.*

Tippoo Sultaun remaining silent for a considerable time after the receipt of my letter of the 9th of January, I concluded that his object must be to delay his answer until the season should be so far advanced, as to render the capture of Seringapatam impracticable during the present year.

At length, on the 13th February, I received from Tippoo Sultaun a letter, informing me, that being frequently disposed "to make excursions

* This is characteristic of his Lordship—and it is owing to the promptitude of his measures, that we may date our success over Tippoo.—Money, is the sinew of War—while procrastination is death to the cause!!!

“sions and hunt,” he was “accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion,” and desiring “that I would dispatch Major Doveton slightly attended.” But the season for negotiation through the pacific channels so often offered by me was now elapsed. After mature deliberation on the grounds already stated, I had directed the advance of the army into the territory of the Sultaun, and I had signified to the Allies my determination to proceed to hostilities. To have delayed the advance of the army, would at once have thrown the advantages which I then possessed into the hands of Tippoo Sultaun, and have rendered the siege of his Capital impracticable during the present season. On the other hand an Embassy, combined with the hostile irruption of any army into Mysore, would have been liable to the imputation of insincerity towards Tippoo Sultaun, and while it bore the appearance of indecision in the eyes of the Allies, would have promoted, and perhaps warranted, a similar degree of instability in their Councils and operations. The design of this tardy, reluctant, and insidious assent to the admission of an Embassy from the British Government, could be considered in no other light than that of a new artifice for the purpose of gaining time until a change of circumstances and of season might enable the Sultaun to avail himself of the assistance of France. This conclusion was now con-

firmed by my knowledge of the actual embarkation of Mr. Dubuc and two native Vakeels, on an Embassy from Tippoo to the Executive Directory of France; an event which took place at Tranquebar on the 7th of February.

I therefore replied to the Letter of Tippoo Sultaun in the terms of the Inclosure, in which I have declared Lieutenant-General Harris to be the only person now authorized by me to receive and to answer whatever communications the Sultan may think fit to make, with a view to the restoration of peace, on such conditions as appear to the Allies to be indispensibly necessary to their common security. This Letter I directed General Harris to forward to the Sultan, on the day on which the army under his command should pass the frontier, and, at the same time, I instructed him to issue, in the name of the Allies, the Declaration.

The Nizam's contingent consists of 6000 of the Company's troops, subsidized by his Highness, of about the same number of his own infantry, including a portion of Mr. Peron's Sepoys, now commanded by British officers, and of a large body of cavalry. This force, under the General command of Mur Allum, formed a junction with the British army on the 19th of February.—Under these circumstances General Harris entered the territory of Mysore, on the 5th of March, with orders to proceed directly to Se-

ringapatam. His Lordship concludes with some reflections upon the prospect of the ultimate consequences and permanent effect of the measures adopted by him. Towards the conclusion he says, " If Tippoo Sultan had been disposed to content himself with the quiet possession of his present dominions ; if he could have been brought to a sense of his own peril in forming a connection with the French, the representations which I addressed to him would have produced an early and salutary impression.----Whatever speculative opinions might have been entertained with respect to his interests, views, and power, the justice and moderation of the British government would never have disturbed his tranquillity. But he resolved to attempt the recovery of his lost dominions, at the hazard of those which he still retains, and in the ardour of his passionate pursuit, he overlooked not only the certain destruction of his own independence, the inevitable consequence even of the most prosperous success of any alliance with France, but also the predominant influence of the English East India Company, which would detect his treachery, and turn against his own empire the ruin which he had meditated against theirs."

Copy of a Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in the East-Indies, on behalf of the Honourable the East-India Company, and the Allies of the said Company there, his Highness the Nizam and the Peshwah.

A SOLEMN Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded at Seringapatam, between the Honourable Company, and the Nabob Asaph Jah and the Peshwah, on the one part, and the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun on the other part; and from that day all commotion and hostilities ceased. Since that day the three allied States have invariably manifested a sacred regard for the obligations contracted under that Treaty with the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun. Of this uniform disposition abundant proofs have been afforded by each of the Allies. Whatever differences have arisen with regard to the limits of the territory of Mysore have been amicably adjusted without difficulty, and with the most exact attention to the principles of equity, and to the stipulations of Treaty. Such has been the solicitude of the allies for the preservation of tranquillity, that they have viewed with forbearance, for some years past, various embassies and military preparations on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, of a tendency so evidently hostile to the interests of the Allies as

would have justified them, not only in the most serious remonstrances, but even in an appeal to arms. On the part of the British Government, every endeavour has been employed to conciliate the confidence of the Sultaun, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit, by the most unequivocal acknowledgment and confirmation of his just rights, and by the removal of every cause of jealousy, which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace. These pacific sentiments have been most particularly manifested in the Governor General's recent decision on Tippoo Sultaun's claim to the district of Wynaad, and in the negotiation opened by his Lordship with regard to the districts of Amarah and Souleah. In every instance the conduct of the British Government in India towards Tippoo Sultaun, has been the natural result of those principles of moderation, justice, and good faith, which the Legislature of Great Britain, and the Honourable the East-India Company, have firmly established as the unalterable rule of their intercourse with the Native Princes and States of India. The exemplary good faith, and the pacific disposition of the Allies, since the conclusion of the Treaty of Seringapatam, has never been disputed even by Tippoo Sultaun. Far from having attempted to alledge even the pretext of a complaint against their conduct, he has constantly acknowledged their justice, sincerity, and good faith;

and has preferred, in the most cordial terms, his desire to maintain and strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord with them. In the midst of these amicable professions on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, and at the moment when the British Government had issued orders for the confirmation of his claim to Wynaad, it was with astonishment and indignation that the Allies discovered the engagements which he had contracted with the French Nation, in direct violation of the Treaty of Seringapatam, as well as of his own most solemn and recent protestations of friendship towards the Allies. Under the mask of these specious professions, and of a pretended veneration for the obligations of Treaty, Tippoo Sultaun dispatched Ambassadors to the Isle of France, who, in a period of profound peace in India, proposed and concluded, in his name, an offensive alliance with the French, for the avowed purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company, and consequently against the Peshwah and the Nizam, the Allies of the Company. The Ambassadors, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, demanded military succours from the French, and actually levied a military force in the Isle of France, with the declared view of prosecuting the intended war. When the Ambassadors returned in a French ship of war, from the Isle of France, Tippoo Sultaun suffered the military force, which they had levied for the

avowed purpose of making war upon the Allies, to land in his country; and, finally, he admitted it into his army; by these personal acts ratifying and confirming the proceedings of his Ambassadors. This military force, however, was not sufficiently powerful to enable him immediately to attempt his declared purpose of attacking the Company's possessions; but in the meanwhile he advanced his hostile preparations, conformably to his engagements with the French; and he was ready to move his army into the Company's territories, whenever he might obtain from France the effectual succours, which he had assiduously solicited from that nation. But the providence of God, and the victorious arms of the British nation, frustrated his vain hopes, and checked the presumptuous career of the French in Egypt, at the moment when he anxiously expected their arrival on the coast of Malabar. The British Government, the Nizam, and the Peshwah, had not omitted the necessary precaution of assembling their forces, for the joint protection of their respective dominions. The strict principles of self-defence would have justified the Allies, at that period of time, in making an immediate attack upon the territories of Tip-poo Sultaun; but even the happy intelligence of the glorious success of the British fleet at the mouth of the Nile did not abate the anxious desire of the Allies to maintain the relations of amity and

peace with Tippoo Sultaun. They attempted, by a moderate representation, to recal him to a sense of his obligations, and of the genuine principles of prudence and policy; and they employed every effort to open the channels of negotiation, and to facilitate the means of amicable accommodation. With these salutary views, the Governor General, on the 8th of November, 1798, in the name of the Allies, proposed to dispatch an Ambassador to Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of renewing the bonds of friendship, and of concluding such an arrangement as might afford effectual security against any future interruption of the public tranquillity; and his Lordship repeated the same proposal on the 10th of December, 1798. Tippoo Sultaun declined, by various evasions and subterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the Allies, and he manifested an evident disposition to reject the means of pacific accommodation, by suddenly breaking up, in the month of December, the conferences which had commenced with respect to the districts of Amurah and Souleah, and by interrupting the intercourse between his subjects and those of the Company on their respective frontiers. On the 9th of January, 1799, the Governor General being arrived at Fort St. George (notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances in the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun,) renewed with increased earnestness, the expression of his Lord-

ship-sanguine desire to dispatch an Ambassador to the Sultaun.—The Governor General expressly solicited the Sultaun to return an answer within one day to this letter; and as it involved no proposition either injurious to the rights, dignity, or honour of the Sultaun, in any degree novel or complicated either in form or substance, it could not require a longer consideration. The Governor General waited with the utmost solicitude for an answer to the reasonable and distinct proposition contained in his letter of the 9th January, 1799. Tippoo Sultaun, however, who must have received this letter before the 15th of January, remained silent, although the Governor General had plainly apprised that Prince that dangerous consequences would result from delay. In the mean while, the season for military operations had already advanced to so late a period, as to render a speedy decision indispensable to the security of the Allies. Under these circumstances, on the 3d of February (eight days having elapsed from the period when an answer might have been received from Seringapatam to the Governor General's letter of the 9th of January,) his Lordship declared to the Allies, that the necessary measures must now be adopted, without delay, for securing such advantages as should place the common safety of the Allies beyond the reach of the insincerity of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the violence of the French. With this view, the

Governor General on the 3d of February issued orders to the British armies to march, and signified to the Commander of his Majesty's squadron, that the obstinate silence of the Sultaun must be considered as a rejection of the proposed amicable negociation. At length, on the 13th of February, a letter from Tippoo Sultaun reached the Governor General; in which the Sultaun signifies to his Lordship, "That being frequently
" disposed to make excursions and hunt, he was
" accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion; adding, that the Governor General would
" be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton to him,
" unattended"----The Allies will not dwell on the peculiar phrases of this letter; but it must be evident to all the States of India, that the answer of the Sultaun has been deferred to this late period of the season, with no other view than to preclude the Allies, by insidious delays, from the benefit of those advantages which their combined military operations would enable them to secure. On those advantages alone (under the recent experience of Tippoo Sultaun's violation of the Treaty of Seringapatam, and under the peculiar circumstances of that Prince's offensive alliance with the French,) can the Allies now venture to rely for the faithful execution of any Treaty of Peace concluded with Tippoo Sultaun? The Allies cannot suffer Tippoo Sultaun to profit by his own sta-

died and systematic delay, nor to impede such a disposition of their military and naval force, as shall appear best calculated to give effect to their just views. Bound by the sacred obligations of public faith, professing the most amicable disposition, and undisturbed in the possession of those dominions secured to him by Treaty, Tippoo Sultaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace, and compelled the Allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honour. For a period of three months he obstinately rejected every pacific overture, in the hourly expectation of receiving that succour, which he has eagerly solicited for the prosecution of his favourite purposes of ambition and revenge. Disappointed in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conquest, he now resorts to subterfuge and procrastination, and, by a tardy, reluctant, and insidious acquiescence in a proposition which he had so long and repeatedly declined, he endeavours to frustrate the precautions of the Allies, and to protract every effectual operation, until some change of circumstances and of season shall revive his expectations of disturbing the tranquillity of India, by favouring the irruption of a French army. The Allies are equally prepared to repel his violence, and to counteract his artifices and delays. The Allies are, therefore, resolved to place their army in such a position as

shall afford adequate protection against any artifice or insincerity, and shall preclude the return of that danger which has so lately menaced their possessions. The Allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Tippoo Sultaun, Lieutenant General Harris. Commander in Chief of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Forces on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar, is authorized to receive any Embassy which Tippoo Sultaun may dispatch to the Head-quarters of the British Army; and to concert a Treaty on such conditions as appear to the Allies to be indispensibly necessary for the establishment of a secure and a permanent peace.

Dated Fort St. George, 22d February, 1799.

By Order of the Right Honourable the Governor General,

N. B. EDMONSTONE, P. T.

Copy of a Letter from the Right Honorable the Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 19th May, 1799.

TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE HONOURABLE
COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONORABLE SIRS,

The accidental detention of the Sarah Christiana packet, enables me to forward to your Hon. Committee by this dispatch, documents of great importance, explanatory of the nature of the

connection between Tippoo Sultaun and the French Republic.

These papers were found in the Palace at Seringapatam, and were transmitted officially to my Military Secretary, by the Secretary of the Commission appointed to assist Lieutenant General Harris in all matters of a political nature.

The Paper, No. 1, is a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Executive Directory, and appears to be an attested Copy of that which was dispatched by M. Dubuc, with two Native Vakeels, on the 7th of February, 1799. The Letter, however, is dated the 20th of July, 1798, at which time the military preparations in the Carnatic had scarcely commenced.

Your Hon. Committee will observe, that in this Letter Tippoo Sultaun, in the most distinct manner, states the nature of his late Embassy to the Isle of France to have been the same which I have described in my minute of the 12th of August, and in my Letter to Tippoo Sultaun of the 8th of November, notwithstanding that he had endeavoured to put a different colour on the transaction in his Letter to me of the 18th of December, 1798, and received at Fort St. George the 25th of December.

It is equally remarkable, that he does not attempt to alledge against the British Government any ground of complaint since the conclusion of the last war.

The object of his offensive and defensive alliance with France, appears to have been not merely the recovery of his former dominions, but the expulsion of the English from all their rich possessions in India, and the utter annihilation of their power in Asia.

You will further observe, that he declares it to be his intention to commence the attack on the first favourable occasion, and, on the whole, that he professes to make common cause with France, under the most solemn protestations of fidelity and zeal to the Republic.

The Paper, No. 2, is a Note of the Demands which Tippoo Sultaun's Ambassadors were authorised by him to make upon the Executive Directory at Paris; they correspond in substance with the requisitions announced in M. Malartic's Proclamation at the Mauritius.

In the Articles 5 and 6, you will perceive that the Sultaun intended to commence his operations in the heart of the Carnatic, in concert with a French army to be landed at Porto Novo; and that he did not propose to wait the actual arrival of the French force, but was resolved to make himself master of the coast of Coromandel as soon as he should find it convenient, after having received notice of the motions of the French.

In Article 7, it appears that the Portuguese colonies in this quarter of India were to have been divided between Tippoo Sultaun and the French.

All the articles of his paper demand particular attention, as tending to prove, in the most conclusive manner, the entire devotion of this infatuated Prince to his alliance with France. This Paper is also dated on the 20th of July, 1798: both Papers are signed in the Sultaun's own hand writing, according to the abbreviated form of signature which he was accustomed to use in all his letters and other official documents. This mode of signature is usual among the natives of Hindostan, and no doubt can be entertained of the authenticity of the Papers.

Your Hon. Committee will observe, that the Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to me, which was received at Fort St. George on the 13th of February, must have been written subsequently to the dispatch of the Papers now inclosed, as M. Dubuc, with the Sultaun's two native Vakeels, embarked at Tranquebar on the 7th of February.

I have the honor to inclose two other Papers, No. 3 and 4, in the French language, found also in the Palace of Seringapatam.

I have the Honor to be,
Honorable Sirs,

Your most obedient and faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

Fort St. George, 19th May, 1799.

*Extract of a Letter from Lord Mornington to
the Chairman of the Court of Directors.*

Fort St. George, 19th May, 1799.

SIR,

THE Sarah Christiana having been detained for a few hours, I am enabled to acknowledge the receipt of the dispatches of the Secret Committee, under date 24th of December.

The intelligence which I have received this day from Seringapatam, induces me to believe that I shall be able to effect a settlement of the country without quitting this Presidency. My brother, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, are far advanced on their way towards Mysore, and I shall wait for their report before I move from hence. I request you to apprise the Court of Directors of the probability of my being able to raise the investment nearly to the standard originally proposed.

The advices from Egypt are by no means satisfactory; it appears that the French had gained some considerable advantages in Syria, and had taken the town of Joppa; it also appears that they had fortified Suez, and had begun to collect craft at the head of the Arabian Gulph. The Centurion and Albatross, and two of the Company's cruizers, were gone up the Red Sea for the purpose of de-roying the craft collected and of preventing the collection of more. The Princess Charlotte Indiamen, armed, together

with the Fox frigate, were probably off the Straights of Babelmandell; having quitted Bombay with that destination some time before. The last intelligence of Commodore Blankett was of the month of January, when he was contending with adverse winds off the coast of Africa, a very few degrees to the northward of the Line. Admiral Rainier was at Cannanore on the 8th of May; it is a satisfactory circumstance to reflect, that if the French should be able, by an accident, to push a force to India by sea, after Admiral Rainier shall have quitted his station, they will find no friend to support them; their arrival, under our present circumstances, would, I am persuaded, only serve to add another triumph to the British arms in India.

I have the honor to be, Sir, &c. &c.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

To the Chairman of the Court of Directors.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General George Harris, to the Chairman of the Court of Directors; dated Seringapatam, 6th May, 1799.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HON. COURT OF DIRECTORS
OF THE UNITED EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c. &c.

SIR,

I have the honor of congratulating you and the Honorable Court, on the prosperous issue of

the expedition committed to my charge by the Right Honorable the Earl of Mornington.

Seringapatam was carried by storm at mid-day of the 4th instant; Tippoo Sultaun killed, with many of his principal officers, and thousands of his adherents; and his family, with the families of his chief Sirdars, in our possession.

My attention is now directed to secure my position, and maintain our advantages, until I can receive further instructions from the Right Hon. the Governor General.

I have the honor to be, Sir, &c. &c.

GEORGE HARRIS.

Head-quarters, Seringapatam, 6th May, 1799.

Copy of a Letter from John Spencer, Esq. to the Court of Directors; dated Calicut, 21st May, 1799.

TO THE HON. THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE HON.
UNITED EAST INDIA COMPANY, &c. &c.

HONORABLE SIRS,

ADMIRAL Rainier having been pleased to order his Majesty's frigate the Carysfort, on her voyage to England, to touch at this place, for such intelligence as might be attainable here of a nature sufficiently interesting to be worthy of your notice, I avail myself of the opportunity to address, while my anxiety to avoid the detention of the Carysfort, particularly at this late period of the season, will necessarily oblige me to be very concise.

General Harris's dispatches will advise you of his glorious and important success at Seringapatam, on which I have the honor to present you with my cordial congratulations.

On the 13th inst. Kemmerrut Deca Khan, one of the principal officers of the late Tippoo Sultan, came in to General Harris with 4,000 horse; and on the 12th, Purweah, a Bramin, one of Tippoo's civil officers, also came in; Fattah Hyder, Tippoo's eldest son, illegitimate, was expected to come in on the 13th; and a salute, which was heard by the Bombay army on that day at Seringapatam, was supposed to announce that event.

The Bombay army under General Stuart left Seringapatam for the Malabar Coast, and there is every reason to expect that the whole will reach Cannanore by the 25th instant; they have had the advantage of very fine dry weather, notwithstanding the advanced period of the season. I understand that the whole of General Stuart's army, including the native corps lately forming a part of Colonel Little's detachment, will be cantoned for the present at or near Cananore and Tellicherry.

The intelligence of our success at Seringapatam of the 4th instant, reached the Right Hon. the Governor-General, at Madras, on the 11th.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Hon. Court, that during the late hostilities between the Hon. Company and Tippoo Sultaun, the tranquillity of the Province, and the realization of the Revenues, have remained uninterrupted, and there is great reason to conclude that the general state of the Province will be very much ameliorated by the very successful termination of the war.

It is expected that part of General Stuart's army will shortly march into and take possession of the country of the late Tippoo Sultaun, which lies on the Malabar Coast, between Kabye, our late northern frontier, and Goa.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

J. SPENCER,

President of the Commission for
executing the Office of Supra-
visor and Chief Judge and Magis-
trate in Malabar.

C H A P. XII.

*Capture of Seringapatam—Death of Tippoo—
Conduct of his sons—Interment of the Sul-
taun—British commander's attention to the
Sultana—Her character—Cursory remarks,
&c.*

THE Capture of Seringapatam and death of Tippoo being but slightly mentioned in the British Commander's letters, it is necessary here to resume the History, and give a full detail of this interesting business. The preceding papers of Lord Mornington sufficiently evince the necessity of crushing Tippoo's power and disappointing his ambitious views.

General Harris, according to orders, proceeded for Seringapatam, where he arrived April 4. The English troops were, the first few days after their arrival, employed in collecting the necessary materials; after which they had repeated skirmishes, in which they took some outposts, &c. so that their breaching batteries did not open till about the termination of the month. Several Polygars and Zemindars of Mysore, had now attached themselves to our allies, and rendered considerable service.

The fire of the batteries which began to batter in breach (April 30) had on the evening of May 2, so much destroyed the walls against which it was directed, that the arrangement was then made for assaulting the place on the following day, when the breach was reported practicable.

May 3. Early this morning the troops intended to be employed, were stationed in the trenches, that no extraordinary movement might lead the enemy to suspect the assault which was determined to be made in the heat of the day. Ten flank companies of Europeans, taken from those regiments necessarily left to guard the camps and outposts, followed by the 12th, 33d, 73d and 74th regiments; and three corps of grenadier sepoys, taken from the troops of the three presidencies, with 200 of his Highness the Nizam's troops, formed the party for the assault, accompanied by 100 of the Artillery, and the corps of pioneers, and supported in the trenches by the battalion companies of the regiment de Meuron, and four battalions of Madras sepoys. Colonel Sherbrooke, and Lieutenant Colonels Dunlap, Dalrymple, Gardiner and Mignan, commanded the several flank troops, and Major General Baird was entrusted with the direction of this important service.

The troops moved at one o'clock from the trenches, recrossed the rocky bed of the Cavery,

under an extremely heavy fire, passed the glacis and ditch, and ascended the breaches in the *fausse braye*, and rampart of the fort, surmounting in the most gallant manner, every obstacle which the difficulty of the passage, and the resistance of the enemy, presented to oppose their progress. Major General Baird had divided his force for the purpose of clearing the ramparts to the right and left. One division was commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, the other by Lieut. Colonel Dunlap; the latter was disabled in the breach, but both corps, though strongly opposed, were completely successful. Resistance had been made from the palace of Tippoo some time after all firing had ceased from the works.

General Harris only gave Tippoo 24 hours to consider the propositions which it was deemed expedient to make to him, respecting our operations against the fort of Seringapatam. These were transmitted by a Vakeel, April 28; but Tippoo returned no answer, obstinately persevering in his determination of defending his capital to the last.

May 4. The breach being now practicable, it was resolved to commence the attack, and at three o'clock in the morning the flank companies of every corps in the field, besides two or three European regiments complete, moved down to the trenches, where they sat for some

time in anxious expectation of the signal, during which time they kept up an incessant firing. The storming party, under the command of General Baird, began to move on, covered by the constant fire from their batteries, and suffering a very galling one of grape from the fort. Great anxiety pervaded the English troops for a quarter of an hour, till they saw their colours hoisted on the ramparts. Loud acclamation of joy then resounded from all parts, and the breast of every British soldier was fired with enthusiasm. The enemy soon abandoned the ramparts, after the English had reached them: in about half an hour, the fire in the fort had entirely ceased, and the British flag was triumphantly displayed in every part of it.

Soon after the storm, 300 grenadiers rushed into the palace, and were about to plunder it, when they were called off. Those inside immediately shut the gates, and the 33d regiment, and a native corps drew up in front. At this critical time, Tippoo Sultaun with his Sultana, sons, treasure, &c. were all in the palace. A little before the attack Tippoo had been making merry with his family; and by the cheerfulness of his countenance, seemed to bid defiance to his adversaries. Major Allan now coming up with a flag of truce from General Baird, after explaining to those who were in the balcony, that no violence should be offered, desired the

Sultaun to be called. They replied that he was wounded : that they did not know whether he was in the palace or not, but that they would look for him. After much delay it was suspected that this was only a pretence to give him time to make his escape ; upon which the general ordered a six-pounder to be brought in front of the gate and told them that if the Sultaun did not immediately make his appearance, he would burst it open. They then positively declared, he was not in the palace, but that his sons would come out immediately. They waited again, for some time, but the sons not making their appearance, Major Allan carrying the flag of truce, and accompanied by two other officers, went in and returned in about half an hour with the two princes, who, though they seemed to hide their depression of spirits, could not but manifest that they felt their situation. Being asked what servants should attend them to the camp, they very nobly replied, " that they had now no right to order : " and when the general told them that they had only to name the persons whom they wished for, and that they should instantly accompany them, the younger said, with a tear starting in his eye, " We could have called for many this morning, but now, I fear, there are but few remaining."

General Baird, who behaved to them with much kindness, gave them in charge to Major

Agnew, who conveyed them in palanquins to Head Quarters.

It being now near sun-set, every one was desirous to secure, if possible, the Mysorean chief. After much enquiry, they found a person, who seemed to be a man of consequence, but his name was unknown. He said that Tippoo Sultaun had been killed in endeavouring to escape. This man was immediately seized, and threatened with immediate death, if he did not show the place. Accordingly, he led the way to a kind of gateway, leading to a bridge across the ditch: there, in a place about four feet wide, and twelve feet long, were upwards of 70 dead bodies, and Tippoo's palanquin appeared in the midst of them. Immediate search was then made for his body, but so numerous were the slain, that it was a full hour before he was discovered. The unfortunate Tippoo had received a shot in his arm at the time of the storm; for he was himself on the ramparts: after this, in endeavouring to make his escape, he was met by a party of Europeans, who wounded him in the side with a bayonet: he had also received a shot in the temple, which put an end to his existence. The body was recognized by his relatives, and some of the palanquin-boys, and was still warm when discovered. He had his sabre clenched fast in his hand.

The Nizam's troops discovered great pleasure, indeed savage satisfaction, when the body was exposed to view; but the English observed the utmost order and decorum. Such a speedy termination to the war not being expected, the former cried with exulting voices, "Seringapatam is taken—the tyrant is dead—his sons and family are prisoners, and all his treasure is at our disposal." General Harris issued orders to suppress their impetuosity.

The surrender of this strong fort, at such a critical time, was particularly fortunate; for the army had only three days grain remaining. When the news was announced at Madras, a general and brilliant illumination took place.

Two days prior to the capture of Seringapatam, Tippoo held a durbar (or council) attended by all his chiefs, who advised him to cede more territory to his besiegers, and the payment of a large sum of money; but Tippoo, seeing that his adversaries had already one half of his dominions, strenuously opposed the measure, and dismissed the council.

Tippoo Sultaun was rather above the middle size, stout, corpulent, and well made. He dressed rather plain, and his head was shaved close. He was in his 51st year when killed, and was interred, agreeable to the supplication of his family, on the left side of his father, in Laul Bang, with all the ceremonies and honors of the place.

His will, and the treaty concluded between him and the French Directory, were found in the Palace. The latter was enclosed in an elegant little box, which was very remarkable, as it discovered the sanguine hopes entertained by the deceased chief of the success of the hostile plans against the British government.

Many of Tippoo's chiefs were slain, particularly Syed Skeb, Meer Saduc, Syed Kofar, &c. His brother Kerim Saheb sought refuge with Meer Allum Behauder.

Tippoo's sons, though suspected at first of dissimulation, behaved with the utmost candour and sincerity. They did not know of their father's death, and were absolutely looking for him as they said. They made no hesitation in surrendering themselves to General Harris, tho' their resistance at first was vigorous. Recollecting the kind treatment they had experienced from Lord Cornwallis, they doubted not but they should now meet with equal civility. The two first captive sons sent to their three brothers, and strictly enjoined them to follow their example.

The news of Tippoo's death filled all the ladies of the Zenanna with the utmost consternation; not on account of any partiality for the chief, but through an apprehension of what frequently attends conquests in these countries; for the natives of India, in all their victories, never paid

that respect which is due to the female sex. These apprehensions were however soon removed by the politeness of the British commander, who sent a flag, immediately after the surrender of the place, to assure them of his protection. His attention to the Sultana, whose sorrow on this occasion was truly sincere, does him equal credit.

This lady is delicately formed, and the lines of her face so regular and placid, that a physiognomist would have had little difficulty to pronounce her of a tranquil and amiable temper; her dress was generally a robe of white muslin, spotted with silver, and round her neck rows of beautiful pearls, from which hung a pastagon, consisting of an emerald and a ruby of considerable size, surrounded with a profusion of brilliants. She is about twenty years of age, and for a complete form, and captivating appearance, rivalled all Mysore.

Among the poor prisoners who had suffered long confinement in a dark dungeon, was a descendant of the Hindoo King of Mysore, whom Hyder Ally dethroned. There were several British officers, supposed dead, who were found still living in these dungeons.

General Baird, who had now taken an active part in defeating the tyrant, had formerly suffered three years confinement in this prison during which time he was loaded with irons and experienced the most cruel treatment.

Considering the magnitude of this enterprise, our loss was inconsiderable, but that of the enemy was very great. One thousand were made prisoners, and about the same number killed. Upwards of three millions of treasure were found in the Palace.

Mangalore is to be added to the British territory in India; a circumstance not more important in the benefit it will render to our commerce and marine than in depriving the enemy of a port in which they found protection and relief.


The partition of the treasures and other spoils of Seringapatam is thus arranged; The arms and military stores are to be given to the King; one clear moiety of all the other produce to the besieging troops, and the other moiety to the East India Company. In Lord Cornwallis's Expedition against the Mysore country, the Company ceded their portion of the booty to the brave captors; but so great are the spoils at present, that it is thought the above share will amply compensate their services, though eminent in the greatest degree.


The standard of Mysore was sent by General Harris to Fort William; it is of light green silk, with a red hand represented in the middle, and was never hoisted but on the Palace in Seringapatam.

This History cannot be concluded better than by quoting the singular and just catastrophe

which was predicted of this tyrant some years ago by an eminent writer: "He would continue to advance till he came to a point from which there was no receding; and then, like a stag at bay, he would terminate his career of despotism, cruelty, and oppression."








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